

# INTRODUCTION TO ORDER OF BATTLE

INTERSCHOOL SUBCOURSE 3001

EDITION D

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This subcourse is designed to teach you basic procedures involved with Order of Battle (OB). Contained within this subcourse are instructions on how to understand Order of Battle and related factors, OB files and references, organizing and maintaining intelligence files, and determining priority intelligence requirements/information requirements (PIR/IR) for OB: You will also learn about tactical intelligence analysis along with intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and dissemination of OB information and intelligence reports.

This subcourse reflects the doctrine which was current at the time the subcourse was prepared. In your own work situation, always refer to the latest publications. There are no prerequisites for this subcourse. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.

## SCOPE NOTE

You will identify procedures for: Order of Battle (OB) and related factors, OB files and references, intelligence analysis techniques, dissemination of OB information, and intelligence reports. You will be given narrative information and illustrations from AR 25-400-2, [AR 220-15](#), AR 380-5, [FM 34-1](#), FM 34-3, [FM 100-5](#), [FM 101-5](#), and [FM 101-5-1](#).

To demonstrate competency of this task, you must achieve a minimum of 70 percent on this subcourse examination.

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## LESSON I

# INTRODUCTION TO ORDER OF BATTLE

### OVERVIEW

**CRITICAL TASKS:** NONE

**LESSON DESCRIPTION:** In this lesson, you will learn to define Order of Battle (OB) and describe the OB factors.

**TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES:** Define OB and describe the OB factors.

**CONDITIONS:** You will be given narrative information from FM 34-3.

**STANDARDS:** Definition of OB and description of OB factors will be in accordance with FM 34-3.

**REFERENCES:** The material contained in this lesson is derived from the following publications: FM 34-3.

### INTRODUCTION

To make sound tactical decisions, the command relies heavily on intelligence regarding the characteristics of the Area of Operations (AO) and the enemy. While the characteristics of the AO can have a tremendous influence on the commander's decision and the success or failure of the operation, the enemy is often the most critical factor that must be considered. Information concerning enemy forces is the most difficult kind to obtain and process. However, this information is vital to develop accurate intelligence on which to base tactical decisions. Information and intelligence concerning the enemy force are referred to as OB. Stated in its simplest form, OB is intelligence on any military force. This includes not only our enemies or potential enemies, but friendly and neutral forces as well. It includes the identification of personnel, units, and equipment.

OB is produced in peacetime as well as wartime. During peacetime, OB is primarily concerned with strategic intelligence. The production of OB intelligence to support tactical operations is initiated when hostilities are imminent. During wartime, OB is both an element of strategic intelligence and an integral part of tactical intelligence analysis. This process is performed by the OB analysis of the G2.

### ORDER OF BATTLE FACTORS

There are nine OB factors. As these are reviewed, you will be able to see how they are interdependent. Individually, each factor pertains to a definite aspect of military force. Collectively, the nine factors determine the total combat power of the force. The nine OB factors are:

#### Composition.

- Unit identification.
- Organization.

#### Disposition.

- Geographical location.

- Tactical deployment.
- Movements.

#### Strength.

- Person net.
- Weapons and equipment.
- By types of units.

#### Tactics.

- Tactical doctrine.
- Special operations.

#### Training.

- Individual.
- Unit.
- Specialized.

#### Logistics.

- Systems.
- Current status.

#### Combat Effectiveness.

- Combat experience.
- Morale.
- Tactics.
- Logistics.

#### Electronic Technical Data.

- Emitter nomenclature.
- Emitter type.
- Mode of emission.
- Frequency range.
- Location accuracy for direction finding.
- Associated use--units or weapon.

#### Miscellaneous.

- Personalities.
- Unit history.
- Uniforms and insignia.
- Code names and numbers.

These nine OB factors are tools used by the analyst to scrutinize all information pertaining to a military force to determine his capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable course(s) of action. Although the situation may dictate that one or more of the factors be given a higher priority, they are, generally speaking, all of equal importance.

**Composition.** Composition is the identification and organization of units. It applies to specific units or commands as opposed to types of units.

Unit identification is often called the key to OB intelligence because it leads to the answers of many questions concerning the enemy. Unit identification consists of the complete designation of a specific unit by name or number, type, weapons, relative size or strength, and subordination. Through identification, the OB analyst develops a history of the composition, training, tactics, and combat effectiveness of an enemy unit. The identification of a specific unit within an organization alerts the analyst to the possible presence of other unidentified units of the same organization.

Organization is the structure of a unit and the relationship of the various elements within the structure. Knowledge of the organization of a unit or military force aids in developing accurate intelligence on current strength, tactics, training, logistics, and combat efficiency. Enemy capabilities are difficult to accurately assess without knowledge of his current organization.

The basic, self-sufficient tactical unit (normally a combat division) is considered when developing intelligence concerning composition. The importance of this concept lies in the term "self-sufficient." Units subordinate to self-sufficient tactical units, although capable of limited independent action, cannot sustain themselves over relatively long periods of time. Subordinate units are seldom used independently or separately from the basic, self-sufficient tactical unit and its three motorized rifle regiments are seldom used independently, the presence not only of a new regiment but of a new division is tentatively accepted. When one of these regiments is located, it may be reasonably assumed the remaining elements of the division are also in the area.

**Disposition.** Disposition consists of the location of enemy units and the manner in which these units are tactically (or administratively in times of peace) deployed. In addition, disposition includes the recent, current, and proposed (or probable) movements of enemy units.

Location refers to a geographical area or position occupied by a unit or units. Knowledge of the strength and location of an enemy assists the intelligence officer in determining the capabilities of the force and its effect upon the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Data of this type is also collected during peacetime and forms the basis for accessing capabilities during the initial period of hostilities.

Tactical deployment is the relative position of units with respect to one another or to the terrain. Tactical formations are designed for executing the various tactical maneuvers. If this deployment can be predetermined, it leads to an accurate appraisal of intentions. The knowledge of how enemy units are echeloned may indicate (if the enemy assumes the offensive) which units will be used in the main attack and which units will be used in supporting reserve roles. Tactical deployment with respect to terrain is also important. A study of dispositions and an analysis of the battlefield area (BA) lead to conclusions concerning enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions.

Movement of enemy units is also part of disposition. Movement is the physical relocation of a unit from one geographical point to another. Patrol activity may be an indication of planned movement. Movement is significant because it automatically changes the tactical deployment of the enemy forces. When an enemy unit has moved, is moving, or will be moving, there are a number of actions which may affect the OB situation. Such as a unit may be moving into an attack position, or moving to reinforce or replace a unit, or perform other missions unknown to friendly forces. In view of these possibilities, movement of an enemy unit becomes important and units must be monitored at all times in order for the OB analyst to provide correct and detailed data on enemy dispositions.

**Strength.** The term "strength" describes a unit or force in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an indication of enemy capabilities, and assists him in determining the probable course(s) of action or options open to enemy commanders. A lack of strength or a preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Likewise, a marked concentration or building-up of units in an area gives the commander certain indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential enemy forces are important factors which may indicate changes in the enemy's intention.

**Tactics.** Tactics in OB intelligence include tactical doctrine as well as tactics used by specific units. Tactical doctrine refers to the enemy's accepted principles of organization and use of forces for the conduct of operations. On the other hand, tactics describe the manner in which the enemy conducts an operation. From a knowledge of tactical doctrine, the OB analyst knows how the enemy will use his forces under various conditions, situations, or special operations.

Conventional enemy forces will normally perform according to certain patterns within the framework of tactical doctrine. There are established principles and patterns for the use of infantry motorized rifle, armor, and artillery in the offense and defense. Any predetermination of the probable patterns of use and enemy action is extremely important in the planning and execution phases of an operation.

**Training.** Individual and unit training significantly contributes to the combat effectiveness of any military organization. The thoroughness, degree, and quality of individual training received by the recruit, specialist, noncommissioned officer (NCO), and officer are major factors in determining the overall efficiency of an armed force. Unit training, normally conducted in seasonal cycles from small unit exercises to large-scale maneuvers, is an essential part of the training necessary for a unit to operate at its full potential. Every training phase adds to the unit's capabilities and effectiveness. The combat effectiveness of an enemy unit is more easily appraised when the degree and quality of its training are known.

**Logistics.** Logistics closely relate to combat effectiveness. The adoption of a course(s) of action is influenced by the ability of the logistical system to support that action. Knowledge of the enemy's logistics facilitates a more accurate evaluation of enemy capabilities, strength, combat efficiency, and disposition. Types of logistics information include:

- All classes and types of supply.
- Supply lines of communication.
- Logistical requirements.

- Procurement methods.
- Distribution priorities and procedures.
- Transportation networks and modes.
- Installations and logistical control points.
- Terminals.
- Evacuation and salvage procedures.
- Maintenance.

**Combat Effectiveness.** Combat effectiveness is a term used to describe abilities and fighting quality of an enemy unit. Combat effectiveness affects the capabilities of a unit or army and may be predicated by analyzing--

- Personnel strength.
- Amount and condition of weapon and equipment.
- Status of Training.
- Efficiency of the officer and NCO corps.
- Quality of leadership.
- Length of time the unit has been committed in combat.
- Traditions and past performance.
- Personality traits of the unit commanders.
- Geographical area in which committed.
- Morale, health, discipline, and political reliability (or belief in the cause for which they fight).
- Status of technical and logistical support of the unit.
- Adequacy of military schooling at all levels.
- National characteristics of the people.

**Electronic Technical Data.** Electronic OB information is required to conduct electronic warfare (EW). Electronic OB technical (EOB TECH) data consist of data on the type of transmission, frequency range, normal use, and the location accuracy for Direction Finding (DF) equipment.

The type of transmission describes the method of modulation of the emitted signal. Frequency Modulation (FM) and Amplitude Modulation (AM) are usually used to transmit sounds or complex data. Frequency Shift Keying (FSK) and on/off keying are used to transmit telegraph codes. Radar signals are often transmitted in pulses of specific duration and frequency of repetition.

The radio frequency of electronic emission determines the characteristics of the transmission path. Lower frequencies travel greater distances near the surface of the earth and are reflected by upper atmosphere and radiate off into space after traveling a relatively short distance near the surface of the earth.

The normal use of certain emissions can be very important to the analyst. Some emissions are uniquely associated with certain unit and weapon systems. EOB TECH data covers a specialized field of knowledge of growing importance. The OB analyst should become familiar with their basic principles and the intelligence that can be derived from them.

**Miscellaneous Data.** Miscellaneous data includes supporting information needed by an analyst to contribute to the development of the other OB elements. Miscellaneous data include basic intelligence that can be described as "know your enemy."

Personality files contain information on certain characteristics and attributes which describe individual members of an enemy military force. Knowledge of personalities is important as an aid to identifying unit, and, in some cases, predicting the course of action the unit will take. Personality data, therefore, is valuable because the tactics and combat efficiency of particular units are closely related to key individuals.

Unit history includes information and intelligence on component elements of a specific unit, present and past parent units, and personalities who have commanded the unit. Other details such as past performance and activities which describe, limit, or clarify the capabilities of the unit should be included in its history. The development of unit history is important because it aids in determining the capabilities and limitations of a unit. Military or paramilitary units, like individuals, develop characteristics which distinguish them from other units. Just as they consider the various qualifications and traits of enemy personalities, OB personnel must also consider an enemy unit as a "personality" in analyzing its capabilities and limitations.

Information on uniforms and insignia is an important part of "know your enemy" intelligence. This information assists in establishing unit identification and organization and in determining morale and esprit de corps.

Some foreign armies use systems of code numbers and names to conceal true designation or affiliation of units, field post numbers, and vehicles. These code number systems, when properly analyzed, are valuable sources of information relating to composition and disposition.

The OB analyst must be able to recognize and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of foreign weapons and equipment. Although technical intelligence agencies are primarily concerned with the determination of weapons and equipment characteristics and capabilities, the analyst uses this intelligence to analyze the effects of these items on the organization, disposition, tactics, and combat effectiveness of the military force.



# EXERCISE

## Instructions

The following items will test your grasp of the material covered in this lesson. There is only one correct answer for each multiple-choice question. To change a response to a multiple-choice question, simply click on a different radio button. To change a response in the matching question, "overwrite" your initial response. **When you have completed the exercise**, PRINT THIS PAGE and check your answers with the answer key. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that part of the lesson which contains the portion involved.

### 1. Which statement best describes Order of Battle Intelligence?

- ☐ a. Is produced only in time of war and is primarily concerned with organization and disposition of military forces.
- ☐ b. Is concerned only with enemy or potential enemy forces.
- ☐ c. Includes intelligence on any military force.
- ☐ d. Should never include allied or friendly military forces.

### 2. Match the indicator with the OB category. [NOTE: Insert your response(s) in the text box aligned with the "indicator". If more than one response applies, separate the numbers by a "comma", for example, "1,4".]

INDICATOR		OB CATEGORY
A. Uniforms	<input type="text"/>	1. Composition.
B. Unit training	<input type="text"/>	2. Disposition.
C. Salvage	<input type="text"/>	3. Strength.
D. Unit location	<input type="text"/>	4. Tactics.
E. National characteristics of the people	<input type="text"/>	5. Training.
F. Unit name, type, and size	<input type="text"/>	6. Logistics.
G. Morale	<input type="text"/>	7. Combat effectiveness.
H. Personality data	<input type="text"/>	8. Electronic technical data.

I. Radio frequency	<input type="text"/>	9. Miscellaneous data.
J. Tactical doctrine	<input type="text"/>	
K. Procurement	<input type="text"/>	
L. Personnel strength	<input type="text"/>	
M. Tactical deployment	<input type="text"/>	
N. Transmission characteristics	<input type="text"/>	

**3. How is OB information used?**

- a. To determine the capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable course(s) of action of a military force.
- b. To determine which of the OB factors should be given the highest priority.
- c. To determine how the weather and terrain will affect our operations.
- d. To determine the capability of a nation's industrial base to support military operations.

**4. When developing OB intelligence, what must the OB analyst remember?**

- a. The disposition of enemy forces is the most OB factor to be considered.
- b. The factor of composition has priority over the other factors.
- c. No one or more OB factors be given higher priority, all of equal importance.
- d. Enemy organization strength is the key to be considered as an operation is begun.

**5. How do order of battle personnel within the G2 section function?**

- a. Intelligence production agencies.
- b. Imagery interpreters for the OB officer.
- c. Information collection personnel.
- d. Interrogators when attached to a battalion.

**SITUATION: You have received a series of messages and are prepared to categorize them according to the appropriate OB factors. Questions 6 through 9 are based on this situation.**

**6. A patrol has reported finding the bodies of 10 enemy troops in a minefield. Documents on the bodies indicate they were members of the 40th MRR, (BMP), 128th MRD. Which OB factor would this information most apply?**

- a. Tactics.
- b. Miscellaneous data.
- c. Strength.
- d. Logistics.

**7. An air observation post (OP) reports sighting approximately 30 enemy tanks in the vicinity of Hill 400. (A full- strength tank battalion has 31 tanks.) To which OB factor would this information most apply?**

- a. Tactics.
- b. Training.
- c. Logistics.
- d. Disposition.

**8. A report from a confidential source locates an enemy motor park of about 40 to 50 trucks in the vicinity of bench mark 300. To which OB factor would this information most apply?**

- a. Logistics.
- b. Unit identification.
- c. Training.
- d. Combat effectiveness.

**9. A patrol reports seeing about 25 enemy soldiers digging fighting positions and laying minefields on the forward slopes of Hill 600. To which OB factor would this information most apply?**

- a. Tactics.
- b. Composition.
- c. Miscellaneous.
- d. Strength.

**10. Which two OB factors are closely related?**

- a. Training and Combat Effectiveness.
- b. Strength and composition.
- c. Strength and Tactics.
- d. Logistics and Training.

**11. Which OB factor would cover information about the 14th combined arms Army being committed to combat for two consecutive months:**

- a. Training.
- b. Logistics.
- c. Tactics.
- d. Combat effectiveness.

**12. Which of the following is a key item in the development of OB intelligence?**

- a. Location of the enemy units.
- b. Organization of the enemy units.
- c. Identity of the enemy units.
- d. Movement of the enemy units.

**13. What is tactical doctrine?**

- a. The adoption of a course of action.
- b. Combat effectiveness of an enemy's unit.
- c. Tactical deployment of an enemy unit.
- d. The enemy's accepted principles of organization and use of forces for the conduct of operations.

## LESSON 1

### EXERCISE ANSWER KEY

#### Instructions

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INDICATOR		OB CATEGORY
A. Uniforms	<u>9</u>	1. Composition.
B. Unit training	<u>5,7</u>	2. Disposition.
C. Salvage	<u>6,7</u>	3. Strength.
D. Unit location	<u>2</u>	4. Tactics.
E. National characteristics of the people	<u>7</u>	5. Training.
F. Unit name, type, and size	<u>1</u>	6. Logistics.
G. Morale	<u>7</u>	7. Combat effectiveness.
H. Personality data	<u>9</u>	8. Electronic technical data.

I. Radio frequency	<u>8</u>	9. Miscellaneous data.
J. Tactical doctrine	<u>4</u>	
K. Procurement	<u>6,7</u>	
L. Personnel strength	<u>3,7</u>	
M. Tactical deployment	<u>2</u>	
N. Transmission characteristics	<u>8</u>	

**3. How is OB information used?**

- a. To determine the capabilities, vulnerabilities and probable course(s) of action of a military force.
- b. To determine which of the OB factors should be given the highest priority.
- c. To determine how the weather and terrain will affect our operations.
- d. To determine the capability of a nation's industrial base to support military operations.

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- a. Intelligence production agencies.
- b. Imagery interpreters for the OB officer.
- c. Information collection personnel.
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**SITUATION: You have received a series of messages and are prepared to categorize them according to the appropriate OB factors. Questions 6 through 9 are based on this situation.**

**6. A patrol has reported finding the bodies of 10 enemy troops in a minefield. Documents on the bodies indicate they were members of the 40th MRR, (BMP), 128th MRD. Which OB factor would this information most apply?**

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- b. Composition.
- c. Miscellaneous.
- d. Strength.

**10. Which two OB factors are closely related?**

- a. Training and Combat Effectiveness.
- b. Strength and composition.
- c. Strength and Tactics.
- d. Logistics and Training.

**11. Which OB factor would cover information about the 14th combined arms Army being committed to combat for two consecutive months:**

- a. Training.
- b. Logistics.
- c. Tactics.
- d. Combat effectiveness.

**12. Which of the following is a key item in the development of OB intelligence?**

- a. Location of the enemy units.
- b. Organization of the enemy units.
- c. Identity of the enemy units.
- d. Movement of the enemy units.

**13. What is tactical doctrine?**

- a. The adoption of a course of action.
- b. Combat effectiveness of an enemy's unit.
- c. Tactical deployment of an enemy unit.
- d. The enemy's accepted principles of organization and use of forces for the conduct of operations.



## LESSON 2

# ORDER OF BATTLE FILES AND REFERENCES

**CRITICAL TASK:** 301-336-1052

### OVERVIEW

#### LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn to organize and maintain a system of sorting and holding of OB information.

#### TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

**TASKS:** Describe the information and procedures required to organize and maintain a system of sorting and holding of OB information.

**CONDITIONS:** You will be given narrative information from [AR 220-15](#), FM 34-3, [FM 101-5](#), and [FM 101-5-1](#).

**STANDARDS:** Organizing and maintaining a system of sorting and holding of OB information will be IAW [AR 220-15](#), FM 34-3, [FM 101-5](#), and [FM 101-5-1](#).

**REFERENCES:** The material contained in this lesson is derived from the following publications:

[AR 220-15](#)

FM 34-3

[FM 101-5](#)

[FM 101-5-1](#)

### INTRODUCTION

In this lesson we will discuss OB references and recording devices available to the OB analyst, and a system of filing which facilitates the easy use of information to produce intelligence. The information received and processed by the OB analyst can become very voluminous in a short period of time. The OB analyst must be able to locate this information on short notice and incorporate it into the current OB situation. This requirement necessitates the information be efficiently organized, categorized and cataloged for easy reference and as a basis for comparison and contrast.

The command echelon, the situation, the unit standing operating procedure (SOP), and the availability of time and personnel will influence the extent of the OB recording system. The mission is to provide the records necessary to produce intelligence, not to become bogged down in record keeping. Only those records that contribute to the accuracy and efficiency of the intelligence production effort should be maintained. OB files must be simple, accurate, and complete.

Order of Battle files should accomplish the following:

- Aid OB personnel in cataloging and compiling current OB information.
- Provide media for cross-referencing for identification purposes.
- Provide collated data for evaluation and interpretation.
- Provide an orderly and systematic method of recording essential information.
- Provide for easy retrieval of accurate and current information.

## **PART A: INTELLIGENCE JOURNAL AND JOURNAL FILES**

The intelligence journal is a required recording device. It is governed by AR 220-15. The journal should contain a synopsis of all messages received in the OB section. The entries should be concise and accurate statements of events. The sender of all messages and reports will be noted with his duty position (S2, 1/17 Armor). The commander of your unit may require only one journal be prepared for the headquarters, or he may have each section of the headquarters maintain a journal.

The journal file will contain copies of messages, reports, and orders. These items will be kept to support the entries in the journal. Information in the journal file is kept in chronological order. The journal and journal file are a permanent record. They are usually historical in nature. Generally, at division, the G2 operations will maintain the journal for the G2 section. In the all-source intelligence section (ASIS), the junior analyst usually will be assigned to record information in the journal.

[Figure 2-1](#) shows a page from the Intelligence Journal (DA Form 1594). The ACTION TAKEN column will generally indicate to whom the information is disseminated. This is usually indicated by an alphabetic code published by the G1 at division or the S1 of brigade or battalion. It may also include where the information is recorded. For example, the entries in this column for item 2 in [Figure 2-1](#), M, WB, G3, F, C, stand for the situation map (SITMAP), workbook, G3, files and a standard distribution list coded "C."

## **PART B: INTELLIGENCE WORKBOOK**

Intelligence workbooks are used to record information under categories used to prepare a major report. At division and below, the unit workbook may be tabbed to the paragraphs of the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). AT corps and higher, it would be tabbed to the paragraphs of the Periodic Intelligence Report (PERINTREP).

The intelligence workbook will be the main part of your filing system at brigade and battalion. There you will not have the room or the time to have extensive files of any type. The intelligence workbook will give you the information you need for reports and answers to the commander's questions about the enemy situation. (See [Figure 2-2](#).)

## **PART C: FILES**

All or some of the recording aids discussed in this lesson may be used, depending on the existing situation and the command echelon. Other forms and filing systems may be developed locally and used when required. The OB files required become more extensive at a higher command echelon.

**Unit Workbook.** A unit workbook is used by the OB analyst or intelligence officer to maintain reported information on specific level organizations, such as divisions or armies. The format of the unit workbook depends upon the structure of the foreign army being monitored and consists typically of a collection of unit worksheets arranged by type of unit or in numerical sequence. (See [Figures 2-3](#) and [2-4](#).) Analysts may use them as unit workbooks by inserting additional pages as new information is received. The analyst may use just one page to list all units in a particular division. The enemy parent unit listed on the unit worksheet should be the same as the analyst's command level. The analyst normally maintains records for enemy units one level above and two levels below his own. On some special purpose units, three levels or more down are followed as well.

**Order of Battle Workbook.** The OB workbook aids in sorting, evaluating, and interpreting information and in preparing intelligence reports. It also allows you to see what information is available in each category without having to search through several files. It has no prescribed format. At corps level and higher, the OB workbook is tabbed to conform with paragraphs of the OB annex of the PERINTREP. At division it will normally be tabbed in accordance with the nine OB factors, [Figure 2-5](#) shows this method of tabbing the workbook. See [Lesson 1](#) for the factors.

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG For use of this form, see AR 750-15. Use preprinted agency in Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations.					PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION		LOCATION		PERIOD COVERED		
G2, 20th Inf Division		BURGEN (LA 567 275) GERMANY		FROM HOUR DATE	TO HOUR DATE	
				0001	07 Dec 92	2400 07 Dec 92
ITEM NO.	TIME IN OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.		ACTION TAKEN		INITIALS
1		Journal opened 0001				RBW
2	0030	1st BDE: 2/20 Inf at 0005 during night recon patrol vic LA 888 912 discovered on supply dump. search continues		M, WB, G3, F, C		RBW
3	0055	ALL UNITS: Aug alt chal/pasaw. Prim comp'd at 070045		S.F.C.		RBW
4	0200	1st BDE: Follow-up mag to J-2: Search results 12xAT mines, 30,000 rds Nato 7.62 ammo, 6 rls barbed wire. Equip dest'd in place G2 & OB				RBW
5		OFF departed HQ for Corps Brief. at 0630. Etr approx 0930		DO		RBW
6	0700	DIST A: Wx forecast for 24 hrs: Prec: None; Ceiling: Unl. Wind: S&SW at 6 KTS; Temp: 62-85; Humidity 15%		F		RBW
7		Div HQ rec'd en arty fire at 0900. Fires lifted 0910. HQ rec'd approx 30 rds, unk cal. Damage unk at present T.F.W.B.M.C				RBW
81		Journal closed 2400				
		SUMMARY				
		There was no en contact during period but Div HQ rec'd 32 rds 8in arty fires with no mater damage. One en ammo dump dest'd				
TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY				SIGNATURE		
ROLAND B. WYNOT, MAJ, MI				Roland B. Wynot		

DA FORM 1594

PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE.

☆ U.S.GPO:1977-0-755-037/13

Figure 2-1. Example of Intelligence Journal (DA Form 1594)




Figure 2-2. Intelligence Workbook




Figure 2-3. Unit Workbook

PARENT UNIT 44 Motorized Rifle Division

SUBORDINATE UNITS	CITY	COORDINATES	INSTL	PERSONALITIES	ID OR CODE NO	REMARKS
Division Headquarters	Stein	PV818147	1 & 3	LTC Dolgiyer, M	ZHELTY DOM	PW No. 26, Captured 2 Feb 90
67 MRR	Delitsch	PU81934	4	CO-COL Sekerfin, D	UAS 349	Document captured 19 Mar 90
80 MRR	Eilenburg	PU852961	2			Deserter 21 Mar 90
145 MTR	Cladbach	PV891024	1			Cladbach residents report battalion subordinate to Head quarters in Eilenburg, 3 Feb 90
U/I MTB	Linburg	PV863106	3	CO-COL Shattrhari, Karala N		Agent report 26 May 90
51 Recon Bn	Lehrt	PV825158	1		MMH035	Order of Battle Book

Example of a Unit Worksheet from a Unit Workbook.

Figure 2-4. Unit Worksheet from a Unit Workbook

There is no standard format for workbook entries. Information is entered under the appropriate heading or headings as either a complete report or a digest of the original report. All entries contain a journal

date and number, in addition to the identity of the source. when appropriate, comments are added after each entry to show the significance of the report when compared with the overall tactical situation. In the "Remarks" column, you may note several items are related or confirmation may be found in another category.

**Order of Battle Situation Map.** The SITMAP is used in all ASIS from battalion to Department of the Army. In the battalion or brigade, it may be the only recording device used in combat. The SITMAP allows you to see the battlefield. You can make an analysis without having to flip through a workbook of files. You will see where the enemy is and his probable courses of action better and more easily. Information will be transferred to the journal as time permits. (See [Figure 2-6.](#))

As a general rule, enemy units one echelon above and two echelons below the analyst's own command level are plotted by using the appropriate symbols in [FM 101-5-1](#). For example, when at division, enemy regiments and battalions are plotted; and at corps, enemy divisions and regiments will be plotted. Higher units are plotted to the extent practicable. The foregoing information is only a guide. Some special purpose units three levels or more down may be followed as well, and information from three levels down reviewed to identify units two levels down. Peculiarities of enemy organization, the tactical situation, and time and personnel available determine more precisely what will be plotted and omitted on OB maps.

During unconventional warfare, however, it may be necessary to plot enemy/insurgent units down to squad level. This is because there may be no large-sized units operating against friendly forces in these situations.

When posting information on the SITMAP, you will use conventional military symbols as the situation dictates. The time and date of the information are entered to the left of each symbol or plotting.

A caption box is placed on the OB SITMAP to identify and explain the OB situation graphics on the map. Although any number of caption boxes may be used, normally three types are necessary--strength, unlocated units, and legend.

**Strength Caption Box.** The entries in the strength caption box usually consist of a digest of strength computations in numbers of personnel, types of units, weapons, and equipment. These entries are categorized as committed forces, their fire support units, and their reinforcements. (See [Figure 2-6.](#))







Figure 2-5. Order of Battle Workbook



**Figure 2-6. OB Situation Map with Caption Box**

Since a reconnaissance company is part of an enemy mechanized division, it is considered a reinforcement. If its position is unknown, it is listed as unlocated. Assumptions must be made to portray significant enemy probably capabilities.

**Unlocated Units Caption Box.** The entries in the unlocated units caption box are important because the OB analyst must be aware of what is not known about the enemy. The unlocated units caption box calls attention to expected units which remain unlocated. A maximum effort must be directed toward establishing the disposition of unlocated units in the AO; these units pose a threat to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.

**Legend Caption Box.** A legend caption box is included on the OB SITMAP when it becomes necessary to improvise symbols for enemy units. Within this caption box, the exact meaning of each improvised symbol is explained. The conventional symbols need not be noted here.

**Overlays.** You may have several overlays associated with the SITMAP. These can be:

- Key terrain
- Fortification.

- Fire support.
- Logistics.
- Minefields.

When at brigade or battalion, you may share the SITMAP with the S3. All OB information will be on overlays. Since the S3 will be plotting friendly information on the same map as you, you will have a better picture of how enemy tactics will affect your unit's mission.

**Order of Battle Card.** OB card files are used to maintain accurate and complete data on enemy units (See [Figure 2-7/2-8](#)). The format of the card is standardized within NATO to facilitate the exchange of information and intelligence among allied forces. OB cards should be maintained at all levels including division and lower when directed by higher headquarters or when necessary. Normally, one card will be maintained on each enemy or other unit in position to affect current operations. (To meet the requirement for more detailed recording and filing of OB intelligence, particularly at higher levels, a supplementary filing system may be maintained. This system generally will be based on the parts of the OB card.)

ORDER OF BATTLE CARD (STANAG 2077)				
1. TITLE-NATIONALITY:		2. CODE NAME:		3. NICK NAME:
4. PARENT FORMATION:		6. FIELD POST NO.		8. COMMANDER:
5. SUBORDINATE FORMATIONS/UNITS: (List only major subordinate elements)		FPN	COMMANDER	7. INSIGNIA: a. Personnel: (Attach patch)  b. Equipment: (Sketch)
9. UNIT HISTORY:		10. MISCELLANEOUS: a. Logistics: b. Training: c. Tactics: d. Other:		
NOTE: This card is a summary of OB information pertaining to the division. Other card files containing information pertaining to the subordinate elements are necessary.				

Figure 2-7. Order of Battle Card (FRONT)

(Back)

**UNIT PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT TABLES**

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34
No Unit		Tac- tical Sym		NCO Off or Men																													
01 1TB			10	70	80	70																											
02 2TB			14	84	98	31																											
03 5TB			10	70	80	74																											
04 121			7	7	7	7																											

**Figure 2-8. Order of Battle Card (Continued)**

The OB card will contain the following information:

- Identification (numerical designation, type of unit, and nationality).
- Field post number (FPN).
- Subordination (parent unit and subordinate units).
- Location (place, name and universal transverse mercator (UTM) grid coordinates).
- Combat effectiveness and category (where applicable).

The OB card contains the following optional information:

- Code name (official name assigned by the enemy for convenience or as a cover).
- Honorific title.

- Nickname (unofficial popular name).
- Insignia.
- Commander.
- Unit history.
- Signature equipment (including significant quantities).
- Turret numbers, vehicle registration numbers, or other tactical identification signs.
- Miscellaneous.

Some of the information required will come from established OB handbooks published by corps or higher headquarters.

**NOTE:** Information that is subject to frequent changes is also recorded on the back of the card ([Figure 2-8](#)).

**Personality Files.** The purpose of these files are to provide reference material used in the development of other OB intelligence. Information on key military figures can be valuable in establishing unit identifications, tactics, and combat effectiveness. The files are kept in alphabetical order. The files contain a biographic sketch of the individual and information obtained from interrogation reports. The card or sheet contains information concerning the individual's name, rank, current assignment, date and place of birth, civilian education, political affiliation, nicknames, and physical peculiarities. Reference is also made to the individual's school, qualifications, awards, decorations, chronology of assignments, and important activities participated in, as well as character traits such as morals, reputation, appearance, and mannerisms. Source and date of information are recorded with each entry.

The personality files also includes information which will aid the commander, G2, and G3 in tactical deception planning and operations. To include habits that make the enemy commander and staff vulnerable to deception, those aspects that present the least likely deception target, the degree of freedom the enemy commander allows his subordinates, the enemy commander's reaction time to new situations, and how the enemy commander's fear of the unknown influences his actions.

**Military Installation Files.** Military installation files are normally maintained during peacetime by higher echelons to facilitate preparation of installation handbooks. The installation files contain information on location, units assigned, and purpose of an enemy installation. An explanatory sheet contains all information that has been collected on each installation. These include the number and types of buildings and their capacities, personnel uniforms and insignia, and major items of unit equipment. (See [Figure 2-9](#).) These files are normally found at corps and higher. Books prepared from these files may be found at division.

**Organizational Worksheets.** The organizational worksheets provide a convenient method of showing types of units within an armed force. These worksheets depict the complete breakdown of all units from the highest type headquarters to the lowest unit. They include information of personnel and major weapons strengths. Since it is rarely possible to fit all this on a single sheet of paper, several charts are prepared. There is a chart showing the general organization of the major unit and individual charts for

each of its subordinate units. Principal weapons and equipment charts are prepared to supplement organizational charts. (See [Figure 2-10](#).)

**Strengths.** The strength worksheet shown in [Figure 2-11](#) is used to maintain a running numerical tabulation of the enemy's personnel and equipment strengths (enemy losses and known gains). This information is recorded on committed units, fire support units, and reinforcements.

**Topical Card.** The topical card is designed as an all-purpose form. It is used for any topic designed by the analyst. It is used to record significant data which are not recorded on another form, such as data on new items of enemy equipment or other data which may clarify enemy OB.

TOWN HEIMERZHEIM									
COORD 33ULB 5220									
INSTL	LOCATION	DESCRIPTION	USE	CAPACITY	STRENGTH	UNIT	TIME LAST INFO	EVAL	REMARKS
1	523208 (201st-40th St)	5 story, red brick bldg flagpole extends from 5th story window	UI HQ	400	Unknown	Unknown	0758	B-2	Many high ranking officers and official Sedan's observed.
2	522211 (Hwy 2 between K and L Sts)	4 x 2 story, wood barracks surrounded by 8' board fence	Trps	500	350?	Eng?	0758	C-2	Sentry observed wearing engineer insignia.
3	531215	6 x 4 story, red brick barracks with 2 story bldg	Trps	1,000	850	Unidenti- fied Army	0458	B-2	Sentry observed wearing art insignia. Known to local residents as Kaiser Bks.
4	533218(N of instl 3)	8 x 1 story garage- type bldg	GUN Park	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Probably belongs to unit in instl 3.9 x 100mm guns observed.
5	514231	2 x 3 story, stucco bldg	Trps	Bn	Bn	1st Bn 19th MRR	1257	A-1	
6	535211	Local ing area, obstacle course in NW corner	---	---	---	---	0458	B-2	Believe used by trps from both instl 2 and 3.
7	554205	Several underground bunkers enclosed by 8' barbed wire fence. Guard towers, located on each corner.	Amnc dump	10 tons (est)	---	---	1257	F-6	

Figure 2-9. Military Installation File Sheet

	PERSONNEL	TANKS	ARTILLERY		ADA			AT		SMALL ARMS	
			122mm SP How	120mm Mort	SA-9	SA-7	ZSU 23-4	ATGM	ATGL	AGS 17	LMG
Regt HQ	65					3					
3XMRB	1290			18		27			99	18	108
Tk Bn	165	40							2		
SP How Bn	220		18						18		18
AA Missile Artillery Bn	60				4		4				
AT Missile Btry	40							9	9		
Recon Co	55								4		3
Engr Co	60								4		
Sig Co	50										
Cml Def Co	35										
Mtr Transport Co	70										
Maint Co	70								4		
Medical Co	25										
Supply and Service Plt	20										
TOTAL	2225	40	18	18	4	30	4	9	140	18	129
*Strength and equipment figures are cumulative.											

**Figure 2-10. Organization worksheet: motorized rifle regiment.**



111th GUARDS MOTORIZED RIFLE EQUIPMENT																				
CATEGORY	PERSONNEL			TANKS			ARTILLERY						APC or IFVs	REMARKS						
	F.I.	Str	Losses	F.I.	Str	Losses	122mm HOW (2S1)		152mm HOW (2S1)		120mm MORT									
1. Committed Forces																				
1st MRB (-)	430		50	13											6					
2d MRB (-)	430		35	13											6					
2. Reinforcements																				
3d MRB	430		10	14											6					
4th TB (1)	165		10																	
3. Fire Support																				
Any Bn or 111 GMR																				
Totals			105	40	11	18	3	18	0	18	3									

NOTE: Additional columns and rows may be added to encompass additional unit or weapons systems.

NOTE: Additional columns and rows may be added to encompass additional unit or weapons systems.

Figure 2-11. Strength worksheet.

The analyst can use a single form as a catch-all for all miscellaneous data, or he can use a separate card for each subject area. Cards should be filed alphabetically by subject. [Figure 2-12](#) is an example of a portion of a topical card.

- **Unit.** Enter complete unit identification to include the parent organization.
- **Date of information.** Enter the date-time-group (DTG) that the activity actually occurred.
- **Reference.** The reference information will enable the analyst to locate the document from which the information is extracted. Enter any information required to identify the source report to include number, date, and the originator. Journal numbers may be used.
- **Evaluation.** Enter an evaluation of the reliability of the source agency, and the accuracy of the information.
- **Type activity/remarks.** Enter a brief synopsis of the activity or information.
- **Topic.** This column is used to identify the basic topic area.

## **PART D: REFERENCES**

Typical OB references currently published are:

**OB Handbooks.** OB handbooks contain background data including descriptions of a foreign nation's political structure, typical organization of that nation's military establishment, and tactical doctrine applicable to various types of military units. They contain technical data such as the logistics system used and the characteristics of weapons and equipment. The Handbook of Military Forces is largely a historical and capability study of a nation's military forces. OB handbooks are normally published by the Department of the Army.

**OB Books.** OB books are compilations of current intelligence which show the composition and disposition of the military establishment of foreign nations. They are normally published by higher commands or at the Department of the Army level. Unlike the OB handbooks, they contain established intelligence data on major identified units and their subordinate elements. They may also contain personality data, lists of logistic installations, unit history data, and other OB data. Changes or updated versions normally are disseminated on a regular basis by the publishing headquarters.

① Units: Include Complete Identification.				
Date of Info ②	Reference, include Report Number, Date of Report, and Originator ③	Eval ④	Type Activity and Remarks ⑤	Topic ⑥

**Figure 2-12. Topical Card**

**Installation Handbooks.** Ideally, installation handbooks contain complete information concerning every military installation in every city in the country or area of interest. They are useful, particularly during Peacetime, for establishing disposition of forces.

**Miscellaneous References.** Other publications and periodicals prepared at departmental and area command levels are of value to the OB analysis. These references may deal specifically with OB of any or all phases of combat and strategic intelligence. Civilian organizations under contract to the Department of Defense make special studies on various subjects concerning foreign and enemy military forces. These studies are usually detailed, technical in nature, and provide a wealth of special information not otherwise available.

## **PART E: COORDINATE REGISTER**

The coordinate register is a recording device primarily designed to provide the brigade and lower echelon analyst or intelligence officer with a workable counterpart to the extensive intelligence files and workbooks maintained at higher echelons. Intelligence data should be organized into related

grouping or into systematized forms, so they can be interpreted without time loss. The coordinate register answers these needs. It can also be compact enough to be carried on the person, with the advantage of ready access.

**Forms of Coordinate Register.** The register most commonly consists of a loose-leaf notebook. Each page of the notebook pertains to a single grid square on the operational map, covering the geographical AO or area of interest. This geographical area should include the enemy area, friendly area, and areas of concern on both flanks.

The pages of the coordinate register are of two types. One type is designed for written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and similar items. These entries are preceded by a DTG and map coordinates. If desired, the S2 may add his personal comments or notations to any entry.

[Figure 2-13](#) illustrates the composition of this type of page for the coordinate register.

GRID SQUARE 32U NA2815				
ITEM	LOCAL TIME	COORD	STATEMENT	NOTES
1	092235	28381539	MG files on recon plt frm A Co.	Have next plt check this area.
2	092318	?	Veh noise - Tk? - Heard direct N of A Co OP 2 28321507.	Ask air OP to look.
3	100600		Special OB report on wpns and fortifications.	Div wants more info on wpns strength.
		28021532 to 28141527	Trenches and bunkers.	Same MG as yesterday? Check this!
		28141522 to 28221529	Wire.	
		28611545 to 28781551	Platoon on line has 2 MG's.	
		28811551 to 29001599	Extensive trenches and firing PSNs.	
4	102335	28391530 to 28691541	B co plt rpts wire and AP mines.	New since 081800.
5	110600	28431588	Res unit (co?) in general area.	(From Div PIR).
6	110630	28381557	Med tk spotted by L plane.	How many more?
7	111320	28731584 and 28151564	Active mortars.	
8	120010	28611564	Flash from small cal arty not OVER 75.	AT? AA? Gun? or AT-4? Ask higher HQ.

**Figure 2-13. Coordinate register with written entries.**

The second type of page is designed to represent a single grid square schematically. Entries are plotted on the square in a manner comparable to that used in plotting the enemy SITMAP. This page of the

register graphically shows any data applicable to a single grid square. An enlarged square is drawn on the page and entries are made as shown in [Figure 2-14](#).

**Use of Coordinate Register.** The coordinate register can be used for the following:

**Interpretation.** the OB analyst or intelligence officer can develop patterns of enemy activity and follow the progress of construction, laying of minefield, and other activities.

**Planning.** In planning, the coordinates register can be used to--

Determine routes of movement, areas of main and secondary attacks.

Provide guidance in selecting missions which should be assigned to patrols and to brief patrol personnel.

Assist in formulating the friendly fire plan in either defensive or offensive situations.

Data from the coordinate register can be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph that has been annotated with grid lines. A scale of 1:25,000 or larger is desirable. By plotting selected OB information on the photo, an analysis of the terrain can be conducted simultaneously with a correlation of information on the enemy. The photo provide an excellent means of briefing commanders down to platoon level on the AO and the enemy situation. Targeting can be done in a more precise manner by using a photo instead of the traditional 1:50,000 map.

**Reference.** The coordinate register can provide answers to the questions of the S2 and his immediate commander and higher headquarters.

**Maintenance of Coordinate Register.** The coordinate register should be reviewed periodically or when unit movement necessitates addition of new data and deletion of obsolete data. Timely maintenance of the coordinates register might not be practical in fast-moving situations such as pursuit, delay, and exploitation.

Whenever possible, the register should be maintained on strong semi-transparent paper such as bond paper. The transparency of bond paper is sufficient to allow the use of a grid scale underneath the schematic page. This allows a more accurate and rapid plotting of or references to the entries.



## LESSON 2

# PRACTICE EXERCISE

### Instructions

The following items will test your grasp of the material covered in this lesson. There is only one correct answer for each multiple-choice question. To change a response to a multiple-choice question, simply click on a different radio button. To change a response in the matching question, "overwrite" your initial response. **When you have completed the exercise, PRINT THIS PAGE, the Order of Battle Workbook pages and the Order of Battle Card.** Check your answers with the answer key. If you answer any item incorrectly, study again that part of the lesson which contains the portion involved.

### 1. Why is it important to catalog OB information as it is received?

- ☐ a. To distinguish between combat information and other information.
- ☐ b. To use as an easy reference and as a basis for comparison and contrast.
- ☐ c. To ensure all information is interpreted before recording.
- ☐ d. To ensure all information is properly filed.

### 2. Which of the following is not accomplished by OB files?

- ☐ a. Provide for an orderly and systematic recording of information.
- ☐ b. Provide for the easy retrieval of information.
- ☐ c. Provide media for cross-referencing.
- ☐ d. Helps to identify critical events.

### 3. What is normally recorded in the ACTION TAKEN block of DA Form 1594?

- ☐ a. The date and time that the journal was opened.
- ☐ b. The clerk's initial.
- ☐ c. Alphanumeric indicators of distribution of information.
- ☐ d. The time that the journal was closed.

**4. How is the intelligence workbook normally tabbed at division and below?**

- ☐ a. To the paragraphs of the PERINTREP.
- ☐ b. To the paragraphs of the INTSUM.
- ☐ c. To the paragraphs of the Intelligence Estimate.
- ☐ d. To the paragraphs of the PERINTREP and the INFLIGHTREP.

**5. For what levels should the analyst normally maintain records for enemy units?**

- ☐ a. One level above and two levels below his own.
- ☐ b. On his level.
- ☐ c. Two levels above and one level below his own.
- ☐ d. One level above and one level below his own.

**6. On the SITMAP, where would you explain an improvised symbol?**

- ☐ a. Strength caption box.
- ☐ b. Unlocated units caption box.
- ☐ c. In the journal.
- ☐ d. Legend caption box.

**7. If you are included in unconventional warfare, to what level may it be necessary to plot enemy units on the OB SITMAP?**

- ☐ a. Battalion level.
- ☐ b. Squad level.
- ☐ c. Division level.
- ☐ d. Company level.

**8. What is the purpose of the OB card?**

- ☐ a. To provide reference material used in the development of other OB intelligence.
- ☐ b. To show types of units within an armed forces.
- ☐ c. To maintain accurate and complete data on enemy units.
- ☐ d. To maintain a running numerical tabulation on enemy's personnel.



**9. Which file provides useful information for tactical deception planning and operations?**

- ☐ a. Personality file.
- ☐ b. Topical file.
- ☐ c. Military installation file.
- ☐ d. Miscellaneous file.

**10. Where would you file information on new items of enemy equipment?**

- ☐ a. Unit workbook.
- ☐ b. Order of Battle Card.
- ☐ c. Strength Workbook.
- ☐ d. Topical Card.

**11. Which of the following statements is true about the coordinate register?**

- ☐ a. Data from the coordinate register can be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph that is annotated with grid lines.
- ☐ b. Data from the coordinate register cannot be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph.
- ☐ c. Data from the coordinate register can be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph that is not annotated with grid lines.

**12. The coordinate register has two types of pages. One type of page is designed to represent a single grid square, schematically. What is the other type designed for?**

- ☐ a. Designed to provide quick reference on individuals.
- ☐ b. Designed to show types of units within an armed force.
- ☐ c. Designed to provide information for the journal.
- ☐ d. Designed for written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and similar items.

**13. In selecting those OB files to be maintained, what should the OB analyst do?**

- ☐ a. Maintain the maximum number of files he can.
- ☐ b. Limit his files to the journal, the OB SITMAP, and the OB workbook.
- ☐ c. Select only those files necessary to his operation.
- ☐ d. Maintain only those files that can be represented graphically.

**GENERAL SITUATION:** You are an OB analyst serving with the G2 Section of the 52d infantry Division (MECH), a part of the US V Corps. Your task is to maintain the OB files. The division mission is to defend along the river from NB834440 to NB794171. Little is known of the enemy forces except the division is opposed by elements of the 2d Combined Arms Army. The 47th Medium Tank Division (MTD) has been identified. The 45th MTD is authorized the following personnel and equipment by TOE:

Personnel: 9,429

Medium Tanks (T-55/62/72): 325

APC: 216

**14. Instructions: This is a practical exercise. You are required to post information from the enclosed messages in the appropriate section(s) of the OB workbook and the OB card.**

**Journal Entry #4:** V Corps reports EPW captured vic NB824381 at 090430 Jul, is a member of 183 MRR, 47 MTD, 2 CAA. EPW was a member of an 8 man Recon Patrol. Patrol mission was to locate tank and personnel obstacles. EPW reports the 183 MRR underwent two weeks of river-crossing training in Jun. EPW from 183 MRR reports Div Cdr of 47 MTD is MG Brelavskiy, code number of 183 MRR is OUY046. (C-3)

**Journal Entry #5:** V Corps reports 7th TFS engaged 17-truck supply convoy vic NB936407, at 090520 Jul. 1 truck destroyed, 3 damaged. (A-2)

**Journal Entry #6:** 1st Bde reports 2/78 Inf encountered 4 enemy medium tanks and 3 APC's vic NB836392 at 090610 Jul. Vehicle markings were OUY046 (Code No. of 183 MRR). 3 tanks and 2 APC's destroyed. 21 enemy personnel KIA. 19 captured (183 MRR). (A-2)

**Journal Entry #7:** V Corps cavalry regiment reports battalion assembly area vic NB972390 at 090730 Jul. 138 MTR, organic to 47 MTD Vehicle markings NHZ556. (A-2)

**Journal Entry #8:** Avn Bn reports 2x122mm How battalions moving forward vic NB945362 at 090920 Jul. (A-2)

**Journal Entry #9:** Intg section reports EPW is Plt Ldr (ref J-6) of 2d Plt, 1 MRC, 2 MRB, 183 MRR. His plt OPCON to 1st Plt, 2d MTC, 183 MRR, captured NB836392. 183 MRR is approx 90% TOE strength in personnel, 100% in equip. Mission was to probe friendly lines to locate strong points to

attack on an open flank. His unit experiencing severe shortage of 7.62mm ammo. EPW is rifle Plt Ldr in 183 MRR. MG Brelavskiy, 47 MTD Cdr is very aggressive. (C-3)

The Order of Battle Card (STANAG 2077) has been incorporated into a database for the ASAS.

The process of entering information in the database is called Text Message Parsing.

The Text Message Processing function permits the operator to prepare and release ODEs (Output Data Elements) based on messages that are not automatically parsed. (To perform this function, after selecting the message from the directory, the operator is presented with screen displays containing the message and candidate ODEs.) The operator can enter data into the ODE Window directly or extract data from the Message to enter into the ODE. After each entry the data is normalized and validated. The functionality is almost identical to Interactive Message Parsing except that the operator selects first the message. There will be no partial ODEs.

Text Message Processing Queue Directory, when the operator selects this option, the Test Message Processing Queue is displayed. The directory format is identical to the Interactive Message Directory except that there is no column for the number of errors in the message. Each summary entry in the Directory Window contains the DTG of Origination, the DTG or receipt, the message type, the Originator, and the number of ODEs awaiting further processing. There is an entry in the last column only if the message had been partially processed and deferred.

# EXERCISE ANSWER KEY

## Instructions

REQUIREMENT: The following material consists of fourteen (13) multiple choice questions and 1 practical exercise. In the multiple choice questions, select only the one best answer.

**1. Why is it important to catalog OB information as it is received?**

- a. To distinguish between combat information and other information.
- b. [To use as an easy reference and as a basis for comparison and contrast.](#)
- c. To ensure all information is interpreted before recording.
- d. To ensure all information is properly filed.

**2. Which of the following is not accomplished by OB files?**

- a. Provide for an orderly and systematic recording of information.
- b. Provide for the easy retrieval of information.
- c. Provide media for cross-referencing.
- d. [Helps to identify critical events.](#)

**3. What is normally recorded in the ACTION TAKEN block of DA Form 1594?**

- a. The date and time that the journal was opened.
- b. The clerk's initial.
- c. [Alphanumeric indicators of distribution of information.](#)
- d. The time that the journal was closed.

**4. How is the intelligence workbook normally tabbed at division and below?**

- a. To the paragraphs of the PERINTREP.
- b. [To the paragraphs of the INTSUM.](#)
- c. To the paragraphs of the Intelligence Estimate.
- d. To the paragraphs of the PERINTREP and the INFLIGHTREP.

**5. For what levels should the analyst normally maintain records for enemy units?**

- a. [One level above and two levels below his own.](#)
- b. On his level.
- c. Two levels above and one level below his own.
- d. One level above and one level below his own.

**6. On the SITMAP, where would you explain an improvised symbol?**

- a. Strength caption box.
- b. Unlocated units caption box.
- c. In the journal.
- d. [Legend caption box.](#)

**7. If you are included in unconventional warfare, to what level may it be necessary to plot enemy units on the OB SITMAP?**

- a. Battalion level.
- b. [Squad level.](#)
- c. Division level.
- d. Company level.

**8. What is the purpose of the OB card?**

- a. To provide reference material used in the development of other OB intelligence.
- b. To show types of units within an armed forces.
- c. [To maintain accurate and complete data on enemy units.](#)
- d. To maintain a running numerical tabulation on enemy's personnel.

**9. Which file provides useful information for tactical deception planning and operations?**

- a. [Personality file.](#)
- b. Topical file.
- c. Military installation file.
- d. Miscellaneous file.

**10. Where would you file information on new items of enemy equipment?**

- a. Unit workbook.
- b. Order of Battle Card.
- c. Strength Workbook.
- d. [Topical Card.](#)

**11. Which of the following statements is true about the coordinate register?**

- a. [Data from the coordinate register can be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph that is annotated with grid lines.](#)
- b. Data from the coordinate register cannot be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph.
- c. Data from the coordinate register can be plotted on a vertical aerial photograph that is not annotated with grid lines.

**12. The coordinate register has two types of pages. One type of page is designed to represent a single grid square, schematically. What is the other type designed for?**

- a. Designed to provide quick reference on individuals.
- b. Designed to show types of units within an armed force.
- c. Designed to provide information for the journal.
- d. [Designed for written entries which describe enemy activities, locations, weapons, and similar items.](#)

**13. In selecting those OB files to be maintained, what should the OB analyst do?**

- a. Maintain the maximum number of files he can.
- b. Limit his files to the journal, the OB SITMAP, and the OB workbook.
- c. [Select only those files necessary to his operation.](#)
- d. Maintain only those files that can be represented graphically.

**GENERAL SITUATION:** You are an OB analyst serving with the G2 Section of the 52d Infantry Division (MECH), a part of the US V Corps. Your task is to maintain the OB files. The division mission is to defend along the river from NB834440 to NB794171. Little is known of the enemy forces except the division is opposed by elements of the 2d Combined Arms Army. The 47th Medium Tank Division (MTD) has been identified. The 45th MTD is authorized the following personnel and equipment by TOE:

Personnel: 9,429

Medium Tanks (T-55/62/72): 325

APC: 216

**14. Instructions: This is a practical exercise. You are required to post information from the enclosed messages in the appropriate section(s) of the OB workbook and the OB card.**

**Journal Entry #4:** V Corps reports EPW captured vic NB824381 at 090430 Jul, is a member of 183 MRR, 47 MTD, 2 CAA. EPW was a member of an 8 man Recon Patrol. Patrol mission was to locate tank and personnel obstacles. EPW reports the 183 MRR underwent two weeks of river-crossing training in Jun. EPW from 183 MRR reports Div Cdr of 47 MTD is MG Brelavskiy, code number of 183 MRR is OUY046. (C-3)

**Journal Entry #5:** V Corps reports 7th TFS engaged 17-truck supply convoy vic NB936407, at 090520 Jul. 1 truck destroyed, 3 damaged. (A-2)

**Journal Entry #6:** 1st Bde reports 2/78 Inf encountered 4 enemy medium tanks and 3 APC's vic NB836392 at 090610 Jul. Vehicle markings were OUY046 (Code No. of 183 MRR). 3 tanks and 2 APC's destroyed. 21 enemy personnel KIA. 19 captured (183 MRR). (A-2)

**Journal Entry #7:** V Corps cavalry regiment reports battalion assembly area vic NB972390 at 090730 Jul. 138 MTR, organic to 47 MTD Vehicle markings NHZ556. (A-2)

**Journal Entry #8:** Avn Bn reports 2x122mm How battalions moving forward vic NB945362 at 090920 Jul. (A-2)

**Journal Entry #9:** Intg section reports EPW is Plt Ldr (ref J-6) of 2d Plt, 1 MRC, 2 MRB, 183 MRR. His plt OPCON to 1st Plt, 2d MTC, 183 MRR, captured NB836392. 183 MRR is approx 90% TOE strength in personnel, 100% in equip. Mission was to probe friendly lines to locate strong points to attack on an open flank. His unit experiencing severe shortage of 7.62mm ammo. EPW is rifle Plt Ldr in 183 MRR. MG Brelavskiy, 47 MTD Cdr is very aggressive. (C-3)

The Order of Battle Card (STANAG 2077) has been incorporated into a database for the ASAS.

The process of entering information in the database is called Text Message Parsing.

The Text Message Processing function permits the operator to prepare and release ODEs (Output Data Elements) based on messages that are not automatically parsed. (To perform this function, after selecting the message from the directory, the operator is presented with screen displays containing the message and candidate ODEs.) The operator can enter data into the ODE Window directly or extract data from the Message to enter into the ODE. After each entry the data is normalized and validated. The functionality is almost identical to Interactive Message Parsing except that the operator selects first the message. There will be no partial ODEs.

Text Message Processing Queue Directory, when the operator selects this option, the Test Message Processing Queue is displayed. The directory format is identical to the Interactive Message Directory except that there is no column for the number of errors in the message. Each summary entry in the Directory Window contains the DTG of Origination, the DTG or receipt, the message type, the Originator, and the number of ODEs awaiting further processing. There is an entry in the last column only if the message had been partially processed and deferred.

## LESSON 3

# ORGANIZATION AND MAINTENANCE OF INTELLIGENCE FILES AND DETERMINING INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR OB

**CRITICAL TASK:** 301-372-3151

## OVERVIEW

### LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn to organize and maintain approved intelligence files and determine information/intelligence requirements.

### TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

**TASKS:** Describe the information and procedures required to organize and maintain approved intelligence files and determine information/intelligence requirements.

**CONDITIONS:** You will be given narrative information from AR 25-400-2, [AR 220-15](#), AR 380-5, and FM 34-3.

**STANDARDS:** Organize and maintain approved intelligence files, and determine information/intelligence requirements IAW AR 25-400-2, [AR 220-15](#), AR 380-5, and FM 34-3.

**REFERENCES:** The material contained in this lesson is derived from the following publications:

AR 25-400-2

[AR 220-15](#)

AR 380-5

FM 34-3

## INTRODUCTION

Intelligence files are necessary to permit ready access to all available information. The files most commonly maintained are listed below.

### **PART A: ORGANIZATION AND MAINTENANCE OF INTELLIGENCE FILES**

**Journal File.** The journal file contains a record copy of each message or document noted in the journal. It supports the journal and is also a permanent and official record.

**OB Files.** The OB files may be just an OB workbook or more extensive files. When made, the extensive files should conform with AR 25-400-2. The file number is 380 or 381. When preparing the OB files, you will use the nine OB factors.



The following list of files is extracted from AR 25-400-2, The Modern Army Recordkeeping System (MARKS), October 86, concerning security and military intelligence.

<b>File No.</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>Disposition</b>
381a.	<p>Intelligence reports files. Reports are gathered in intelligence offices resulting from the--</p> <p>a. Collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of technical intelligence.</p> <p>b. Domestic intelligence or information about activities or conditions in the US which possibly or really threaten the internal security.</p> <p>c. Information on the war potential, military geography, military forces, and other military and related activities of foreign countries.</p> <p><b>NOTE:</b> Record copies of intelligence reports are kept by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA).</p>	Destroy after 2 years
380-150a	<p>Intelligence collection files. Documents on the procurement and selection of intelligence information. They also include--</p> <p>a. Intelligence collection plans.</p> <p>b. The scheduling of collection requirements.</p> <p>c. The monitoring and evaluation of collection priorities.</p>	
380-150b	<p>Scientific and technical intelligence product files. These files consist of--</p> <p>a. One copy of each confirmed DIA scientific and technical intelligence production (study, trend study, report, handbook, and comparable productions).</p> <p>b. Contributions (inputs) to other agency products.</p>	Permanent
380-150c	Intelligence dissemination files. Documents on the dissemination and distribution of--	Permanent.

- a. Finished intelligence.
- b. Intelligence reports.
- c. Scientific and technical information.

381-20a	Intelligence confidential fund files. Documents on expenditures of special funds. These funds cover expenses incurred in discharging assigned duties of agents for the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) not otherwise payable from other DA funds. Included are--	Offices performing Army-wide responsibility: Destroy after 8 years.
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- a. IG inspection reports of accounts.
- b. Intelligence contingency funds.
- c. Property books.

381-20b	<p>Captured documents files. Documents captured or confiscated in wartime by international law. This also includes records of foreign government, military, private, and other institutions. Keep a separate entity to preserve administrative origin and arrangement to the fullest extent practicable. (This description does not include captured cryptologic records.)</p> <p>NOTE: After an Army agency has completed intelligence or other exploitation of captures documents, it will request disposition instructions from HQDA (SAIS-ISP), Washington, DC 20310.</p>	Permanent.
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The following list of files is extracted from AR 25-500-2.

File No.	Description	Disposition
381	<p>These records concern collection, identification, evaluation, control, classification, and dissemination of general and technical intelligence data. Matters relating to subversion, espionage and counterintelligence activities.</p> <p>a. General military intelligence correspondence files. General correspondence relating to military intelligence that cannot logically be filed with the</p>	<p>Destroy after 2 years.</p> <p>Destroy when no longer needed for current operation.</p>

detailed record listed below:

b. Documents relating to military intelligence that are received for information only and on which no action is required.

- |                                      |  |                        |
|--------------------------------------|--|------------------------|
| 381a                                 | Intelligence reporting files. These files consist of copies of documents that have been submitted to higher headquarters. Included are-- | Destroy after 2 years. |
| a. Reports on domestic intelligence. |  |                        |
| b. Foreign positive intelligence     |  |                        |
| c. Technical intelligence.           |  |                        |
| d. Related documents.                |  |                        |

You should use the files listed in AR 25-400-2 at all levels. Approved intelligence files are those files you, as the supervisor, have deemed necessary. The unit records management officer will approve files not shown in regulations.

These files will be cut off on 31 December of each year and a new file will be started. The disposition or time period for which you must retain these files is noted in each extract.

When preparing these files for use, you can prepare one file folder or binder at a time. Prepare succeeding file folders on an "as needed" basis.

The lead file folder will contain the title and disposition; succeeding folders will have the file number and source or document and title. More information on this subject may be found in AR 25-400-2.

Information filed in the information/intelligence files can be cross-referenced to other files with the same or corresponding information. When cross-referencing, you need to place a form (DA Form 1613) in each file which you want cross-referenced. This is described in AR 25-400-2.

**Updating the Information/Intelligence Files.** Updating the Information/Intelligence Files consists of either adding changes or supplements to existing documents or removing obsolete or superseded documents from the files. Documents may be bound, loose, or stapled together. These documents may be technical or doctrinal studies of enemy weapons or tactics.

When adding supplements to the information/intelligence file, you will place them with the original document. They may be new pages or additional pages to be added to the original. A supplement may be a continuation of the information in the original document.

Changes are made to the content of the original or merely added to the document. When making a change, the analyst should place the DTG when he made the change and his initials on the front page of the change.

The information/intelligence files may be classified, and the analyst must ensure the change or supplement has the same classification markings on it as the original. When an unclassified supplement is added to a classified document, you must either file it as a whole or add it to the document and add classification markings.

Whenever documents are removed from a classified file, a cover sheet with the appropriate classification shown must be attached.

**Cross-referencing.** The OB and information/intelligence files can be cross-referenced. This means most of the information contained within one file can be found in another file. This saves time when trying to find information on a subject.

In cross-referencing, you will normally write it on a form within the file. For OB files and workbook, you will note next to the data on the data sheet where additional information, or the report is filed.

A DA Form 1613 will be used when cross-referencing the information/intelligence files. The form may be used in the OB files when information is not heavily cross-referenced and will be placed in the front of the files being cross-referenced. Additional information may be obtained from AR 25-400-2.

**Maintenance of the Information/Intelligence Files.** When using the information/intelligence files, you must remember information will become obsolete or superseded. You must review the files at regular intervals to ensure the information remains current.

In filing, you will put the new information in front of the old. This will keep the newest information within easier reach. It will also make integration easier because the newest information can be compared as you place it in the file.

## **PART B: DETERMINING INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS FOR OB**

The commander directs the intelligence effort through the G2 or S2. The G2 or S2 translates the commander's guidance and concept of the operation into intelligence requirements and establishes priorities. Intelligence requirements and priorities are expressed in terms of PIR and IR (see [Figure 3-1](#)).

### **DEFINITION OF PIR/IR**

<b>INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS</b>	
<b>PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE</b>	Those intelligence requirements for which a commander has an anticipated and stated priority in his task of planning and decision making.
<b>INFORMATION</b>	Those items of information regarding the enemy and his environment which need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of the commander.

**Figure 3-1.**

PIRs are the highest priority intelligence requirements. Any enemy capability, course of action, or characteristic of the battlefield environment which will have a critical impact on the commander's tactical decisions are PIR.

IRs are the specific items of information needed to satisfy the intelligence requirements. They are a basis for collection operations. They include information needed to satisfy PIR as well as the other intelligence requirements.

What does this mean to you as an OB analyst or as an intelligence officer working in OB? PIRs are those items of information which you will need to answer questions regarding the enemy situation. IR is information you need to confirm a specific deduction you have made.

Determining the Initial Information/Intelligence Requirements. The initial requirements for information/intelligence are determined when the unit receives its mission. At division, the corps intelligence estimate will contain the OB information needed to start your files. At brigade and battalion you will use the division's intelligence estimate.

Once you have received the initial OB information, you will determine what information you will need to supplement or complete the information received. This is done by a careful review of the information on hand and the AO. Your review is aimed at finding gaps in the information. If there are gaps in the information, you need to answer questions from the G2 or commander, you will submit a recommendation that information be collected as PIR to fill these gaps. If the gaps are in areas where you need information to clarify deductions or enemy actions, you will submit a recommendation for collection as IR.

You determine periodic requirements for information/intelligence in essentially the same way.

## **COLLECTIONS AND PROCESSING OF OB INFORMATION**

Collection. OB information is collected by all personnel in a unit. The soldiers in the front line will report what they see. This combat information then will be passed through channels for use by the OB analyst.

OB analysts and intelligence officers assist the G2 in continuously planning the collection effort. They may be required to draft collection memoranda for the guidance of collection agencies. The OB analyst or intelligence officer will review the OB files to ascertain what gaps exist in the holding and report these gaps to the G2 for inclusion into the collection effort.

Organization for Collection and Processing. Most of the processing at division is done in the ASIS, Division Tactical Operation Center Support Element (DTOCSE), of Headquarters, Headquarters Company Division. Some of the processing will be done in the battalion and brigade S2s.

The company team will draw its assets from the different companies of the battalion. The Headquarters, Headquarters and Support Company will supply the Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE). The collection and jamming (C&J) company will supply the very high frequency (VHF) electronic attack (EA), high frequency (HF)/VHF EA, voice intercept, and transcription and analysis teams. The Intelligence and Surveillance (I&S) company will supply ground surveillance radar, Counterintelligence (CI), and interrogation teams. The company team headquarters may be the headquarters of one of the companies, either Electronic Warfare (EW), C&J, or intelligence and surveillance.




Figure 3-2A MI Bn. (A series)




Figure 3-2B MI Bn. (L series)

Other agencies are also used to collect information. The cavalry unit assigned to division and the scout platoons in the battalions will report on the enemy's disposition. The Division G2 will also assign collection missions to units subordinate to the division, and task them through the G3. The corps G2 will provide reports of aerial reconnaissance, long-range ground surveillance and OB references.

The collection effort begins by determining requirements and establishing their priorities. Based on requirements, the analytic and control element (ACE) manages the collection effort. The ACE develops

a collection plan that is keyed to mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T), the commander's concept of the operation, and the current situation. It continuously updates the collection plan.

The ASIS assists the ACE in planning and supervising the collection effort. The All-source production section (ASPS) identifies gaps in the intelligence data base and helps convert intelligence requirements into specific information requirements (SIR). The ASIS monitor incoming reports and advise the ACE. PIR and IR are satisfied, new requirements are identified or requested information is no longer needed.


**Processing Information.** Processing is the phase in the intelligence cycle whereby information becomes intelligence. It consists of recording, evaluating, and analysis ([Figure 3-3](#)).

**Recording.** Recording information into the data base makes evaluation and analysis easier and more accurate. Each echelon must decide on the recording means that permits timely dissemination of information and intelligence. The most common means are the intelligence journal, intelligence files, situation map (SITMAP), intelligence workbook, coordinate register, and OB records. Other files and maps are used when required.

**Evaluation.** Evaluation of information is needed to determine its intelligence value. Evaluation includes determining the pertinence of information, the reliability of the source or agency, and the credibility of information.

At this stage, the information must also be evaluated for credibility and pertinence. Credibility has two components: Source reliability and information credibility.

**Determining Source or Agency Reliability.** The headquarters closest to the source, or agency, is ordinarily the best judge of the reliability of the source or agency. Source reliability is determined and recorded on the incoming report by the collecting unit or agency. The ASIS personnel also judge reliability based on the past performances of the reporting unit or agency by comparing it with similar information which may already be available, and assess an overall reliability factor for each incoming report. The overall reliability factor is marked on each report and clearly distinguished from the factor assessed by the reporting agency. The reliability of each incoming item is evaluated by a standard system using letters A to F. The overall source or agency reliability factor is signified by various degrees of confidence as shown in table 1.



**Figure 3-3. Order of battle recording devices and the processing of order of battle information.**

Determining Credibility of Information. Credibility is designated by a number between 1 and 6 as shown in [table 2](#).

**Table 1. RELIABILITY OF SOURCE/AGENCY TABLE**

LETTER	DEGREES OF CONFIDENCE	USE
A	Completely reliable	Only assigned under the most unusual circumstances.
B	Usually reliable	Indicates a source of energy of known integrity.
C	Fairly reliable	Indicates a source or agency that is fairly reliable.
D	Not usually	Indicates a source or agency not



	reliable	usually reliable.
E	Unreliable	Indicates a source or agency usually unreliable.
F	Reliability cannot be judged	Assigned when there is no adequate basis for estimating the reliability of the sources.

**Table 2. Credibility of Information Table**

LETTER	DEGREES OF CONFIDENCE	USE
1	Confirmed by other sources	Used when it can be stated with certainty that the information originated from two or more different sources.
2	Probably true	Used when no proof of the above can be established, and no reason exists to suspect that the reported information comes from the same source.
3	Possibly true	Used when investigation reveals that the reported facts are compatible with the previously observed behavior of the target, or if known background of a target leads to the deduction that the target might have acted as reported.
4	Doubtful	Used when reported but unconfirmed information contradicts the estimate to the development or the known behavior of a target.
5	Improbable	Used when reported information is not confirmed by available data and contradicts the experience assumed to be reliable with regard to the development of a target or issue.
6	Truth cannot be judged	Used when an investigation or a report reveals that a basis for allocating ratings 1 to 5 does not exist.

**Combined Ratings.** To determine the combined ratings, the two aspects of evaluation, reliability and credibility, must be considered independently. The rating is expressed as a letter-number combination. For example, information received from a usually reliable source judged as "probably true" is rated as "B2". Information from the same source, but judged as "cannot be judged" is rated as B6.

**Pertinence.** The next step in the process is evaluating intelligence and information reports for pertinence. Information is evaluated for pertinence by determining if the information is-

- Pertinent in regard to the enemy or the characteristics of the AO.
- Needed immediately.
- Of future value.
- Of no apparent value.

A decision is then made concerning the report's value. If a report is determined not to be pertinent, it will be filed for possible future reference. Coordination with the collection manager in the ACE is made to modify or clarify tasking. Pertinent information is then used with other information in the data base.

## **ANALYSIS**

Analysis consists of three steps, shown below.

**Assessment.** Assessment is the sifting and sorting of evaluated information to update significant elements with respect to the mission and operations of the unit. Assessment requires judgment and a thorough knowledge of the principles of military operations, the characteristics of the BA, and the enemy situation, to include enemy doctrine and past practices, and a clear understanding of the unit mission and the commander's intent.

Assessment at headquarters above division level often involves detailed research, with greater difficulty caused by the increased volume of information. The individuals who will be involved in performing analysis must relate their efforts to the mission of the command in order to avoid wasted time and effort.

**Integration.** Integration is the combination of the elements isolated in analysis with other known information. It forms a logical picture or hypothesis of enemy activities or the influence of operational area characteristics on the mission of the command. In the process, more than one hypothesis may be formulated based upon existing intelligence.

Integration, particularly the development of hypotheses, requires the same good judgment and thorough background knowledge essential to making a good analysis. In formulating hypotheses, the intelligence officer must avoid pre-conceived opinions and hypotheses based solely on personal experience or preference. He must attempt to place himself in the role of the enemy commander in the development of these hypotheses.

After they are formulated, hypotheses are analyzed and tested. Analysis of a hypothesis includes determining the indications that should exist if the hypothesis is a valid one. Testing includes verifying the existence or non-existence of these indications within the limitations of available time and means.

Integration may be a mental process completed in a few moments or it may be a lengthy process involving the collection of a large volume of additional information.

**Deduction.** The last step in the analysis of information is deduction. Meaning is deduced from the hypothesis developed; these are then tested and considered valid as a result of integration. Deduction answers the question, "What does this information mean in relation to the area of operations, the enemy situation and the friendly commander's intent?" The resulting answer reduces friendly vulnerability to being deceived and the false belief that tactical deception (TAC-D) operations are being believed by the enemy.

In the process of assessment, you will sift all the information you have received from all sources and weigh it against the information on file and against known enemy doctrine.

Integration is the placing of new information in the file and purging of superseded information. Place new information with similar information in the file so you can see the progress of an enemy action or determine the lack of a specific action.

You make your deductions based on the information you have gleaned from your files, the enemy situation, and known enemy doctrine as you perceive them.

This process will enable you to answer questions given to you by the commander, G2, or officer-in-charge concerning probable courses of action, current strengths, or disposition of enemy forces.

### **ANSWERING PIR/IR**

The commander's PIR will come to you in the form of questions such as, "Will the enemy reinforce? If so, when, where, and in what force?" When you analyze the PIR you will ask yourself what indicators would provide an answer. In the example you would ask yourself, "What are the indicators of enemy intent to reinforce?" If you look in appendix C of this subcourse, you will find several indicators listed under reinforcement. They are:

- Movement of additional troops toward the front.
- Increased traffic toward present position.
- Identification of new units in the combat zone.
- Additional command posts (CPs) and supply and evacuation installations.

When you review your OB records and incoming messages from collection agencies, you could find a credible message that describes a new enemy unit in the combat zone. If you do, the first part of the commander's question can tentatively be answered "yes," and you have some information useful in answering the second part. When your review of data on hand does not provide answering information, these agencies will be tasked to collect them.

The reports you generate from OB information are a record of your deductions and assumptions. In some reports, you will record and disseminate the actual OB information as well.

## LESSON 4

# TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

**CRITICAL TASKS:** 301-336-1600

[301-336-1601](#)

[301-336-1602](#)

[301-336-1603](#)

[301-336-1604](#)

[301-336-2400](#)

[301-336-2401](#)

[301-336-3353](#)

[301-336-3354](#)

[301-336-3355](#)

[301-336-3356](#)

301-372-2050

301-372-2051

301-372-2052

301-372-2053

301-372-2054

301-372-2055

301-372-2056

301-372-2057

## OVERVIEW

### LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn the techniques of intelligence analysis, the two Principles of War in Intelligence Analysis and the four steps of the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) process.

### TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

**TASKS:** Identify the techniques of intelligence analysis, the Principles of War in Intelligence Analysis, and the steps of the IPB process.

**CONDITIONS:** You will be given narrative information from [FM 34-1](#), FM 34-3, [FM 34-130](#), and [FM 100-5](#).

**STANDARDS:** You will describe the techniques of intelligence analysis, the Principles of War in Intelligence Analysis, and the steps of the IPB process IAW [FM 34-1](#), FM 34-3, [FM 34-130](#), [FM 100-5](#), and [FM 34-130](#).

**REFERENCES:** The material contained in this lesson is derived from the following publications:

[FM 34-1](#)

FM 34-3

[FM 34-130](#)

[FM 100-5](#)

## **INTRODUCTION**

In recent years, the intelligence community has devoted considerable effort and resources to improve the mechanical and organizational aspects of intelligence production. The development of sophisticated, technologically advanced collection systems, has given us a vast capability to collect information. Additional efforts are in progress to speed the flow of information from the collector to the processor and computerize the recording, organizing, and manipulating information.

Unfortunately, there have been few developments to improve our ability to evaluate and interpret information to produce intelligence. The purpose of evaluation and interpretation is to analyze available information to determine the enemy's capabilities and probable courses of action.

This is a human function. The analyst must add the elements of judgment, a function that cannot be programmed into a machine.

The purpose of this lesson is to familiarize the OB analyst with various tools and thought processes which will help him make more valid judgments concerning enemy capabilities and probable course(s) of action.

## **PART A: INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES**

Principles of War (Mass and Economy of Force). The tactical doctrine of most armies recognizes nine principles of war. They are:

- Mass.
- Economy of force.
- Objective.
- Offense.
- Security.
- Unity of command.

- Maneuver.
- Simplicity.
- Surprise.

Tactical intelligence analysis must focus on identifying the enemy's application of these principles. Mass and economy of force are the most critical. Normally the combat resources available to the enemy commander to accomplish his mission will be limited. Therefore he must allocate sufficient resources at the critical places on the battlefield while economizing elsewhere. He will normally concentrate troops, firepower, mobility, and support where he intends to make his main effort.

The problem of identifying the enemy's capabilities and determining his most probable course of action is largely one of determining where he is massing his combat power and where he is economizing his forces. The principle of massing may be somewhat limited when there is a threat that nuclear weapons may be used to deliver the main attack. Massing would also be minimized to prevent creation of a nuclear target. Even in this situation, some concentration of effort will be required to allow timely exploitation of successful nuclear strikes.

Composition. Identify the composition of the enemy force at least one echelon above your own. For example, if you are working at the brigade level, attempt to identify the composition of the opposing division. The enemy operates as a part of a target command and control structure. The mass and economy of force problem must be resolved at each echelon. The higher echelon commander's scheme of maneuver and his allocation of combat power and support will impact directly on enemy capabilities in your own zone/sector. Identifying enemy composition facilitates construction of a composite picture of the total enemy force structure. This includes information on identified and unidentified, located and unlocated units, total reinforcements, types and amounts of combat support/combat service support, and the identification of special capabilities (river-crossing, EW, nuclear delivery, etc.).

Detailed analysis of enemy composition assists in quantifying the degree of uncertainty that still exists in critical areas; a judgment that impacts on the degree of confidence we can place in our estimate. Most intelligence judgments are made on the basis of fragmentary evidence. By comparing available information with information on the total force composition, the analyst can determine the percentage of the total picture on which his judgment is based. For example, agencies may report that four enemy artillery batteries have displaced forward. We might then generalize that enemy artillery is displacing them forward, which is an indicator of attack. If the total enemy composition indicates 40 artillery batteries are available, we recognize our judgment is based on only 10 percent of the total picture. Ninety percent is still uncertain. It is vital the analyst be conscious of the degree of uncertainty remaining in any situation.

Enemy Activity Outside Your Zone. Analyze the significance of enemy activity outside your zone/sector. Consider the "big picture" when assessing the meaning and significance of enemy activity within your area of operation. Enemy boundaries are not identical to our own. Events

outside our boundaries may be part of the enemy's overall scheme of maneuver. Analysis of outside events may provide indicators or areas of focus within our area. Events within our area may require correlation with outside events if they are to be correctly interpreted. This is closely related to and facilitated by determining the composition of the enemy forces.

Enemy Tactical Doctrine. Become familiar with the enemy's tactical doctrine. Enemy commanders are trained in their country's tactical doctrine and given frequent opportunities to apply that doctrine during field exercises and maneuvers. Though some commanders will be more or less innovative, most will consciously or unconsciously apply a learned doctrine when confronted with a specific situation. The analyst should be familiar with:

- Unit frontages/depths for attack and defense, frontages for the main attack(s) and secondary attacks.
- Characteristic dispositions associated with various courses of action.
- Indicators.
- Allocation of combat/combat service support.
- Expected sequence of events.
- Information on the conduct of specialized military operations (river-crossings, air assault operations, etc.).

These specifics relate directly to the determination of mass and economy of force. Doctrinal information facilitates analysis by serving as a basis for comparison and for interpreting actual events.

Effects of Weather and Terrain. Incorporate judgments on the effects of weather and terrain. Weather and terrain are physical constraints which impact on enemy capabilities and either favor or limit his adoption of a particular course of action. Analysis and discussion of enemy capabilities frequently neglect the effects of weather and terrain. Many military disasters can be directly attributed to a failure to correctly assess environmental factors.

Enemy Force Structure and Terrain Constraints. Relate the enemy force structure to the physical constraints imposed by the terrain, particularly avenues of approach. There are four techniques for determining the enemy's application of mass and economy of force by relating enemy dispositions and the terrain.

- Determine unit boundaries and relate them to avenues of approach. Boundaries may be identified by locating enemy reconnaissance and cavalry units (which often have distinctive equipment), terrain and doctrinal analysis of EPW capture locations, and other techniques. Identification of boundary locations will assist in mass and economy of forces determinations and in deciding the enemy's perception of avenues of approach.
- Compute enemy strength in terms of committed forces, reinforcements, and supporting weapons for the entire front, then recompute for each avenue of approach. Determine

whether enemy combat power and support are evenly distributed or one option is weighted.

- Analyze enemy allocation of available lines of communication. Available roads for the movement of tactical units and logistical support are usually limited. The enemy allocates these lines of communication according to their priority of effort. Analysis of enemy boundaries and traffic patterns can be an important indicator of identifying his support priorities and his most probable course of action.
- Identify potential enemy objectives and relate them to enemy dispositions and avenues of approach. Weighting may be determined through unit boundaries, strength computation, and route allocation.

Pattern Analysis. Use pattern analysis to identify the presence of indicators or enemy activity. This concept is based on the premise that the adoption of a particular course of action will result in characteristic dispositions and patterns of activity that can be identified and correctly interpreted. The analyst must organize and record incoming information to ensure meaningful relationships can be established. IPB, which is discussed later in this lesson, provides the analyst with patterns that may be used as a basis for comparison. The IPB process integrates the enemy's tactical doctrine and the effects of weather and terrain.

Weight Indicators. In combat, the analyst is usually confronted with conflicting indicators. An enemy force will go to great efforts to deceive us by portraying indications which point to the adoption of a course of action which he does not intend to adopt. Enemy forces may use patterns associated with attack, defense and delay simultaneously. These conflicting patterns may result from intentional deception, imprecise execution, temporary indecision, random activity, or incomplete/inaccurate information. The analyst requires a thorough knowledge of the enemy and of the characteristics of the BA which can effect military operations. Particularly valuable is detailed knowledge of enemy organization, equipment, tactical doctrine, and logistical methods; the probable enemy knowledge of the area under friendly control; the personalities of the enemy commanders and the past performance of the opposing enemy units. This action may not be the most numerous. The analyst must develop a way to identify those indicators that are most indicative of a course of action. There are several techniques which may be used individually or in combination.

One technique of determining the enemy's intent is to consider the origin or source of the indicator, or why the enemy presents a certain pattern. Indicators stem from military logic, doctrinal training, organizational constraints, bureaucratic constraints, or the personality of the enemy commander.

Military logic implies there is an obvious solution for every military problem. For example, military logic dictates artillery be used well forward for attack and echeloned in depth for defense. Violation of this logic implies a loss in combat power or support at some critical point during the operation.



A nation's Tactical Doctrine includes military logic and much more. Tactical doctrine begins where military logic ends. This is where military experts disagree. For example, both US and Commonwealth of Independent States doctrines dictate that artillery be used well forward to support an attack. Yet the respective doctrines disagree on artillery use in an assault gun role.

The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) former Soviet Union's emphasis on detailed, repetitious training, designed to inbreed a sort of reflex action enhances the value of doctrinal indicators. Though some commanders may display some imagination and creativity, indicators based on tactical doctrine are generally reliable.

Organizational structure represents a special case of doctrine. The composition of a division (size, organization, weapons, and organic support) is a matter which the military establishments of different countries have resolved in radically different ways. The fact a US division has three subordinate maneuver headquarters as opposed to four in the former Soviet division, and differences in the composition and structure of the division base, will result in distinctively different patterns associated with US and former Soviet operations.

The Enemy Commander is the final source of indicators. Each commander has a personal history of training, experience, success, failure, and personal idiosyncrasies. Many are creatures of habit, prone to repeat what has worked in the past; others are creative and innovative. All are somewhat captives of their experiences. The enemy commander's personality may be a major source of deviation from established enemy patterns of activity. The relative weight given the enemy commander's personality is variable. In case of a strong, innovative, or idiosyncratic commander (Patton, Rommel, etc.), his influence may be more important than doctrine or training, but in the case of a methodical, traditional commander, his personality may rank last.

Weigh heavily those indicators which:

- Reflect or are based on the principle of mass. The enemy can be expected to conduct deception operations. However, deception operations are normally conducted "on the cheap," attempting to deceive us with the least expenditure of resources. Indicators based on a major confirmed commitment of forces are most likely to reflect the true situation.
- Are most difficult to fake. This includes not only those which require mass, but also those in which the complexity of execution would negate their use for deceptive purposes.

Time Sequence of Events. Analyze the time sequence of events. While the analyst must exercise care in attributing significance to the time sequence of events, it is advisable to consider time and space relationships as an additional safeguard. Time and space relationships can serve as a major tool for exposing deception. Deception is frequently conducted with minimum expenditure of scarce resources. Careful analysis of information from different sources may reveal significant discrepancies, such as the same unit at different locations on the battlefield at the same time.

Enemy Combat Effectiveness. Integrate a judgment on the enemy's combat effectiveness. This judgment is based on an analysis of tangible factors (percent of tables of organization and equipment, strength of personnel and equipment, available supply rates, and so on) and intangible factors (morale, training, political reliability, etc.). Unfortunately, there is no scientific method of arriving at combat effectiveness judgments. It does, however, have a definite bearing on a unit's capabilities and most probable course of action.

Enemy G2s Perception. Consider the enemy G2s perception of the friendly force. Though enemy capabilities exist independently of the enemy's assessment of friendly forces, his choice of alternative courses of action does not. Attempt to determine the enemy's perception of friendly capabilities through analysis of his collection capabilities, known collection activities, and inadvertent security violations by friendly forces which might have been monitored by enemy intelligence. Detailed analysis of potential disclosures will enable you to partially reconstruct the enemy G2s SITMAP.

Mentally Wargame the Advantages/Disadvantages. Think about each of the identified enemy capabilities from the enemy commander's point of view. The analyst must remember he can never obtain a complete picture of all the factors that impact on the enemy commander's decision process. The enemy commander's perspective (training, background, ideology, etc.) is different from his own, and the analyst is working with incomplete and/or inaccurate information.

Avoid Preconceptions. The objective of the intelligence analysis is not to prove a judgment, but to improve it. Experience suggests preconceptions are the analyst's principal obstacle. There is always the danger the analyst will reach a preliminary judgment, then seek and weigh evidence to confirm his initial estimate, while he dismisses or passes over any inconsistent or conflicting information. Mental neutrality is critical. He must reserve judgment, maintain objectivity, be aware of the degree of uncertainty that exists, and constantly test his hypothesis against the available evidence.

## **PART B: INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)**

IPB is the detailed analysis of the enemy, terrain, and weather within a specific geographical area. It is initiated during peacetime or before the next operation and continues throughout combat operations.

IPB is the "homework" that must be done to prepare for the next war or the next battle. Its purpose is to focus attention on specific threat forces and specific operational areas.

IPB integrates and analyzes the enemy tactical doctrine and the effect of terrain and weather relative to the commander's mission and specific battlefield conditions. It provides a valuable data base for the commander through the four types of templates.

The IPB Team. This team is comprised of the ASIS, the supporting engineer terrain team, and the United States Air Force (USAF) weather team. Its responsibility lies with the OB analysts of the intelligence production section at corps and division CPs. The team must assist the engineer topographic team and USAF weather team. Together, these teams form the IPB team. The OB

analyst is the expert on the enemy; the engineer topographic team is the expert on terrain, and the USAF weather team is the expert on the weather.

IPB Analysis Procedures. IPB emphasizes the use of graphics, such as overlays, annotated maps, photographs, and templates. The graphics can be constructed from various physical media, such as acetate overlays, or through computer assisted display. This helps the analyst visualize the enemy's tactical formations, the effect of terrain and weather, and how the enemy might alter his formations to adapt to specific terrain and weather. There are four steps in IPB analysis.


- Define the battlefield environment.
- Describe the battlefield effect
- Evaluate the Threat.
- Determine threat course(s) of action.

Step 1: Define the Battlefield Environment. It is during this step that the G2 or S2 establishes the limits of the battlefield by identifying the area of operations (BA) and the area of interest (AI). This also helps identify gaps in current intelligence holdings and specific intelligence required to fill them.

Step 2: Evaluate the Battlefield's Effects upon Courses of Action. In this step, the G2 or S2 fully explores what the environment encourages and discourages in the way of friendly and threat courses of action by analyzing all the characteristics at the battlefield environment that may effect operations. It is during this step that weather and terrain are analyzed.

Step 3: Evaluate the Threat. In this step, the G2 or S2 and his or her staff analyze the command's intelligence holdings to determine how the threat normally organizes for combat and conducts operations under similar conditions. The G2 or S2 are able to accomplish this by studying historical databases and creating threat models.

Step 4: Determine Threat Courses of Action. In this step, the G2 or S2 combines what the threat normally prefers to do, and the specific environment in which he is operating now and determines courses of action available to him. During this step the G2 or S2 develops situation templates, event templates, and event matrices to show commanders possible threat courses of action.



**Figure 4-1. Areas of Operations.**

#### **BATTLEFIELD AREA OF OPERATIONS**


	Approx Time	Approx Distance
	Beyond FLOT*	Beyond FLOT*
BN	0-3 Hrs	5 Km
BDE	0-12 Hrs	15 Km
DIV	0-24 Hrs	70 Km
Corps	0-72 Hrs	150 Km
EAC**	72+ Hrs	250 Km

#### **AREA OF INTEREST**

BN	0-12 Hrs	15 Km
BDE	0-24 Hrs	70 Km
IV	0-72 Hrs	150 Km
Corps	0-96 Hrs	200 Km
EAC	96+ Hrs	1,000 Km

\* Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT)

\*\* Echelons Above Corps (EAC)



**Figure 4-2. Doctrinal template: MRD (primary attack) with RAGS and DAGS.**

A series of doctrinal templates are developed to a standard map scale 1:50,000/1:250,000 to depict the enemy's doctrinal formations for various type and size units and for various types of operations such as attack, defend, retrograde, and so on. These templates depict the frontages, depths, echelon, and spacing of combat, combat support, and combat service support systems. These doctrinal templates depict how the enemy would like to fight were it not for physical constraints of the terrain and the effect of weather. [Figure 4-2](#) is an example of a doctrinal template. Doctrinal templates serve as a basis for pattern analysis.

The appropriate doctrinal template, developed in [step 4](#), is placed over the combined obstacle overlay ([Figure 4-5](#)) and shifted until likely avenues of approach take place ([Figure 4-8](#)).

Avenues of approach begin at enemy assembly areas and end at the enemy objective. Having identified the most likely avenues of approach and mobility corridors, the analyst can evaluate the military aspect of each avenue of approach.

[Figure 4-3](#) is an overlay depicting built up areas, lines of communication, and wet areas. This will aid the analyst in developing main supply routes which in turn will indicate likely avenues of approach.

The vegetation impeding movement as shown in [Figure 4-4](#) assists in determining areas of trafficability. This should not imply movement through these areas would be totally impossible, but rather minimum doctrinal rates of speed could not be met if movement were attempted through these areas.

[Figure 4-5](#) is particularly important because it integrates all obstacles into one display. This greatly simplifies further analysis of avenues of approach and mobility corridors. All obstacles are cross-hatched and the blank areas are those where the enemy forces can move.




Figure 4-3. Built-up areas, and hydrology overlay.



Figure 4-4. Trafficability Overlay.



Figure 4-5. Combined Obstacles Overlay.



**Table 3**  
**Weather Factor Analysis Matrix.**

INTELLIGENCE USES/ APPLICATIONS	Temperature	Humidity	Intervisibility	Surface Winds	Precipitation	Snow/Ice Cover	Winds Aloft	Cloud Data	Light Data	Severe Weather	Fog
Observation and FoF			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Artillery Emplacements	X	X		X	X		X			X	
Concealment			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X
Camouflage	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X
Ground Avenues of Approach	X		X		X	X				X	X
Air Avenues of Approach	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Cross-Country Movement	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	
Fording Sites	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X
Air Drop Zones	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Helicopter and STOL/VTOL LZ/PZ	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
LOCs and MSRs	X		X		X	X		X	X		
NBC Operations	X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X
Line-of-Sight (Radio/Radar)					X	X				X	
REMS Emplacement	X			X	X	X				X	
Infiltration Routes			X		X	X			X	X	X

Effects of precipitation can also be graphically illustrated. [Figure 4-6](#) shows riverbanks and swamps that have swollen, rendered fording and unassisted river-crossings more difficult.




Figure 4-6. Weather Effects Overlay.

The illustration in [Figure 4-7](#) shows the effects of precipitation on a slope. Based on the type of soil, drainage, and amount of rainfall, conditions are degraded to mainly restricted and severely restricted.





Figure 4-7. Terrain and weather factor combined overlay: SLOPE.



**Figure 4-8. Likely Avenues of Approach.**

#### Templating.

- Doctrinal templates are first used in the development of the Situation Templates ([Figure 4-9](#)). These templates relate enemy tactical doctrine to the constraints of terrain. Terrain constraints and weather effects will cause the enemy to deviate from classic frontages, depths, and echelon spacing. Situation templates are prepared for each critical point/area called Named Areas of Interest (NAI), along each avenue of approach and mobility corridor. The NAI are geographical areas where the analyst can expect significant events or activities to occur (see [Figure 4-10](#)).
- Event Template is a prediction of events and activities at each NAI. (See events analysis matrix [Figure 4-11](#).) An event matrix is completed for each mobility corridor within each avenue of approach. This matrix enables the analyst to correlate what is expected (activity) and where and when (location and time) at each NAI. The situation template

and the event analysis matrix aid in directing collection agents where to look, when to look, and what to look for.

- Decision Support Template (DST) is essentially an intelligence estimate in graphic format. It helps to identify critical events relative to time, location, and the current situation, which will require tactical decisions. For example, when the mission is to defend, the commander must have intelligence in time to make and execute a decision to mass combat power at the critical time and place. The decision support template alerts him not only where to mass, but when he must make his decision. [Figure 4-12](#) is an example of a decision support template.

## **PART C: TARGET VALUE ANALYSIS**

Targets on the battlefield will normally exceed the number of available sensors and weapons that can be used against them. Thus it is important to find and attack those targets of highest payoff to the friendly commander. Collection resources and weapon systems are directed against these enemy forces, systems, and activities that will yield the highest payoff in terms of disrupting his operations, reducing his combat effectiveness, and facilitating the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The process of identifying high value targets (HVT) and establishing priorities for their attack is called target value analysis (TVA).

Critical nodes are situation dependent because of the changing tactical situation. They are echelon/service dependent because of the different capabilities of collection, target acquisition, and weapon systems at different echelons.

Establishment of priorities for attacking HVT is essential. Before each operation, the commander designates the targets whose destruction or neutralization are most critical to his mission and establishes priorities for attacking these targets. These targets are called high payoff targets (HPTs). He then directs his intelligence resources to locate these targets. Target priorities will change as the tactical situation evolves.

IPB is the key to effective TVA. The IPB data base assists the analyst to determine the relative value of targets. It also cues him as to where these targets might be located, and when and where they can be attacked to achieve decisive results.




Figure 4-9. Situation template.




Figure 4-10. Named areas of interest.

EVENTS ANALYSIS MATRIX				
<b>Coordinates:</b> <b>AVENUE OF APPROACH: #1</b>			<b>FROM:</b> <u>NB085320-NB656233</u> <b>TO:</b> <u>NB462171-NB494132</u>	
<b>MOBILITY CORRIDOR: ALPHA</b>			<b>FROM:</b> <u>NB070300</u> <b>TO:</b> <u>NB468158</u>	
NAMED AREA OF INTEREST	DISTANCE	ESTIMATED TIME	EVENT ACTIVITY	OBSERVED TIME
<b>NAI # 1</b> NB649288 (BRIDGE)	 2.0km	 8 min	A. RECON ELM	1500
			B. ADV GUARD	1510
			C.	
<b>NAI # 2</b> NB647264 (RD JUNCT)	 6.5km	 25 min	A. RECON ELM	1508
			B. ADV GUARD	1520
			C.	
<b>NAI # 3</b> RR X-ING			A. RECON ELM	1533
			B. ADV GUARD	EST 1545
			C.	
<b>NAI # 4</b> NB561220 DECISION PT			A. RECON ELM	EST 1544
			B. ADV GUARD	
			C.	
<b>NAI # 5</b>			A.	
			B.	
			C.	

Figure 4-11. Events analysis matrix.




Figure 4-12. Decision support template.



## LESSON 5

# DISSEMINATION OF ORDER OF BATTLE INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE

CRITICAL TASKS: 301-336-1106

[301-336-1107](#)

[301-336-1108](#)

[301-336-3106](#)

[301-336-3112](#)

[301-336-3113](#)

301-372-2017

301-372-2100

301-372-2250

## OVERVIEW

### LESSON DESCRIPTION:

In this lesson, you will learn to identify reports used to disseminate information and intelligence.

### TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

**TASKS:** Identify reports used to disseminate information and intelligence.

**CONDITIONS:** You will be given narrative information from FM 34-3.

**STANDARDS:** You will identify reports used to disseminate information and intelligence IAW FM 34-3.

**REFERENCE:** The material contained in this lesson is derived from the following publications: FM 34-3.

## INTRODUCTION

Intelligence dissemination is the final critical phase of the intelligence processing. Emphasis must be placed on disseminating needed intelligence at the right time. Although dissemination of information and intelligence is not normally a phase of the OB analyst, he should ensure the prompt reporting of significant results of detailed analysis.

A fast-moving battle situation dictates using the quickest means of getting information to the user. Electrical message, secure voice radio, and telephone are the mainstay of intelligence dissemination. Unformatted, fragmentary messages and standardized report formats carry the bulk of intelligence and are transmitted as soon as possible to keep pace with the constantly changing situation.

Information and intelligence are placed in the hands of the user in time to permit his evaluation and interpretation, formulation of plans, and initiation of action under the existing situation. If the information is of such value time does not permit complete processing before dissemination, the user should be made aware of this fact. An update with additional intelligence on the same subject will be transmitted as soon as it is available.

## **INTELLIGENCE REPORTS**

Most intelligence is disseminated rapidly and directly to the user. Unscheduled intelligence reports commonly used are:

- Spot Report.
- Tactical Intelligence and Translation Reports.
- Bombing, Shelling, Mortaring (BOMREP, SHELREP, MORTREP), and Aircraft Hostile Fire Reports.
- Weather Forecasts.

**Scheduled Intelligence Reports.** One objective of intelligence dissemination is to ensure that intelligence staffs at all echelons have the same general picture and use the same frame of reference in planning their operations. Therefore, some schedule-driven reports and briefings are used as time and available manpower permit. The periodic intelligence report (PERINTREP) and the intelligence summary (INTSUM) may be used with other reports to keep intelligence staffs aware of the total picture. These reports are disseminated to the next higher, lower, and adjacent commands as deemed necessary. They are of low priority, however, and prepared and disseminated after the immediate intelligence needs are met. The PERINTREP is used to disseminate detailed information and intelligence.

**Intelligence Summary (INTSUM).** The intelligence summary contains a brief summary of the most current enemy situation covering a period of time designated by the commander. This period of time will vary with the desires of the commander and the requirements of the situation. It provides a summary of the enemy situation in forward and rear operation, enemy operations and capabilities, and the characteristics of the weather and terrain. It aids in assessing the current situation and updates other intelligence reports. Negative information is included, but no operational information is excluded. The INTSUM reflects the intelligence officer's interpretation and conclusions regarding enemy capabilities and probable course(s) of action. The INTSUM is prepared at brigade and higher echelons and disseminated to higher, lower, and adjacent units. The INTSUM has no prescribed format except the word "INTSUM" will be the first item of the report. Appendix A illustrates the format of an INTSUM.

**Order of Battle (OB) Annex.** An OB annex is a document containing OB intelligence which is normally disseminated with the PERINTREP. Appendix B provides guidance concerning the preparation of the PERINTREP. It is a means of disseminating newly developed intelligence and only OB intelligence developed during the reporting period is presented. The format is as prescribed by Standardization Agreement 2014 (STANAG 2014). Appendix C provides guidance concerning the preparation of the OB annex to the PERINTREP.

## **Other Intelligence Reporting Documents.**

**Intelligence Estimate.** The primary purpose of the intelligence estimate is to:

- Determine the courses of action open to the enemy and the probable order of their adoption.
- Disseminate information and intelligence.
- Determine PIR concerning the enemy and the AO.

The intelligence estimate is a logical and orderly examination of the intelligence factors affecting the accomplishment of a mission. It provides the commander with an analysis of the AO and the enemy strength and capabilities that can influence his mission. It is used as a basis for planning and disseminating intelligence.

An intelligence estimate may be prepared at any level. It may be written or oral, formal or informal, detailed or summarized. It is normally written at division and higher and briefed down to battalion.

[Appendix E](#) is an example of an intelligence estimate.

**Operations Plan (OPLAN) and Operations Orders (OPORD).** Intelligence on enemy forces is disseminated in paragraph 1a of the operations plan or order. When intelligence is too voluminous to include in paragraph 1a of the operations plan or order, an intelligence annex is prepared. The intelligence annex is a formal tasking document that may accompany an operations plan or order.

Paragraph 1 of the annex gives a summary of the enemy situation in sufficient detail to understand the plan or order. Subsequent paragraphs contain specific collection requirements and instructions.

[Appendix D](#) is an example of the OB annex.

**The Intelligence Report (INTREP)** - is a standardized intelligence report which is disseminated on a required basis. An INTREP is prepared when facts influencing enemy capabilities have been observed or when a change in enemy capabilities has taken place. The INTREP is passed to higher, lower, and adjacent units at the discretion of the commander producing the report. It is dispatched as quickly as possible following the receipt of the information and sent by the most expeditious means available. There is no prescribed format for the INTREP except the acronym "INTREP" will be the first item to appear in the report. Time permitting, the INTREP includes the originating office's interpretation of the information or intelligence being reported. The INTREP is normally an end product of OB analysis.

**The Supplementary Intelligence Report (SUPINTREP)** - is a standardized NATO report form used for more comprehensive reviews concerning information on one or several specific intelligence targets. It may also contain selected intelligence data collected over an extended period of time and include items contained in the INTREP or INTSUM.

The nature and content of data contained in the SUPINTREP dictate the specific dissemination. At the commander's discretion, the SUPINTREP is passed to higher, lower, or adjacent units. It is normally produced on special request or in support of a particular operation and is dispatched by the most suitable means available.

## APPENDIX A

# FORMAT AND SAMPLE INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

(Extracted from FM 34-3)

Format of an INTSUM.	IMMEDIATE
NOTE: Omit items not applicable unless otherwise indicated.	TO CG 2d CORPS
1. Issuing unit (always included).	INTSUM NUMBER 144 ENDING 040600
2. Time and date of issue (always included)	PARA 3 ALFA ---- CONTINUED DEFENSE IN ZONE EXCEPT FOR LOCAL ATTACK AT
3. Summary of enemy activity or period	0415 VICINITY RS376759 WITH ESTIMATED
a. Ground activity.	90 MEN CMM 3 MEDIUM TANKS CMM AND
b. Trace of forward elements.	LIGHT ARTILLERY SUPPORT PD ATTACK
c. Potential targets for nuclear weapons.	REPULSED PD PARA 3 DELTA ATTACK
d. Nuclear activity.	PRECEDED AT 0410 BY VERY HIGH AIR BURST NUCLEAR WEAPONS CMM
e. CB activity.	GROUND ZERO RS374761 CMM DELIVERY
f. Air activity.	MEANS UNDETERMINED CMM YIELD
g. Naval Activity.	ESTIMATE AT 0 PD 5 KT PD PARA 3
h. Other. (new tactics, counter-intelligence).	FOXTROT ATTACK SUPPORTED BY 2 JET/
4. Enemy personnel and equipment losses.	ATTACK AIRPLANES BOMBING AND STRAFING VICINITY RS396756 FOR 5 MINUTES STARTING AT 0425 PD
a. Personnel (KIA).	PARA 4 ALFA CONFIRMED 20 KIA CMM
b. Enemy prisoner of war.	ESTIMATED 5 KIA PD PARA 4 BRAVO
c. Equipment destroyed or captured.	10 INCLUDING 2 WIA PD PARA 4 CHARLIE
5. New obstacles and barriers.	2 MEDIUM TANKS DESTROYED CMM 1 DAMAGED CMM 1 JET ATTACK AIRCRAFT
6. Administrative activities.	SHOT DOWN PD PARA 6 PRISONER
7. New identification*.	STATES AMMUNITION SUPPLY IN FORWARD UNITS RUNNING LOW PAREN
a. Units.	
b. Personalities.	
8. Enemy movements.	
9. Estimated number and types.	
10. Weather and terrain conditions.	

11. Brief discussion of capabilities.

12. Conclusions always included.

CHARLIE DASH 3 PAREN PD PARA 7  
ALFA

PATROL REPORTS BATTERY 152 MM  
GUN-HOWITZERS AT RS303292 PD

PRISONERS CONFIRM LOCATION 2D

BATTALION CMM 17F MECH  
REGIMENT

RS375758 PAREN BRAVO DASH 1 PAREN  
PARA 8 AIRBORNE RADAR

RECONNAISSANCE DETECTED 10  
TRUCKS MOVING SOUTH ON ROAD  
ATRS330280 AT 0345 PD PARA 9

PROBABLY ROUTINE SUPPLY  
VEHICLES PD PARA 10 SNOW STARTED  
AT 040545 AND CONTINUING PD  
GROUND FROZEN HARD AND  
SUPPORTS ALL TYPES OF VEHICLES PD  
PARA 11 LOCAL

Examples of a Division INTSUM (full  
distribution not indicated) FM CG 52D INF  
DIV (MECH).

ATTACK REPORTED PROBABLY WAS  
TO SEIZE HILL 405 PD ENEMY IS  
CAPABLE OF CONTINUING DEFENSE  
IN PRESENT POSITION CMM MAKING  
LOCAL ATTACKS TO IMPROVE HIS  
DEFENSIVE POSITION CMM DELAYING  
TO STRONGER POSITION ALONG  
LAURIEX RIVER PD PARA 12  
CONTINUED DEFENSE IN PRESENT  
POSITION MOST PROBABLE.

## APPENDIX B

# PERIODIC INTELLIGENCE REPORT FORMAT

(Classification)

Copy No. \_\_\_\_\_

Unit Location

Date-time-group

Message reference number

PERINTREP NO.

Period covered: (date and time to date and time).

References: Maps or charts.

Disposal instructions: (if any).

1. **GENERAL ENEMY SITUATION.** This paragraph contains a brief summary of enemy operations during the period. Amplifying details are furnished in the paragraphs that follow and in appropriate annexes, or both. This paragraph provides brief highlights of the enemy situation and the significance of the enemy's major activities, to include marked changes in morale, strengths, dispositions, tactics, combat effectiveness, and equipment. Data that are lengthy or can conveniently be shown graphically are presented in annexes.

2. **ENEMY ACTIVITIES.** This paragraph, in conjunction with the following, provides the details of the situation summarized in paragraph 1. Detailed intelligence provided in this paragraph covers all operational activities. Information may be presented graphically by overlays, printed maps, sketch maps, and annexes. Subparagraphs are omitted when appropriate intelligence is not available or is adequately covered by other portions of this report.

a. **Ground.** (Primarily includes activities of combat arms, reserves, and reinforcements; also includes enemy defenses, mine fields, fortifications, barriers, obstacles, and other defensive works.)

b. **Air.** (Includes Air Force activities such as bombing close air support, tactical aerial reconnaissance; air surveillance and air-supported operations.)

c. **Airborne.**

d. **Irregular.**

e. **Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical Operations.**

f. **Electronic Warfare.**

g. **Other.** (Normally includes other than combat arms; includes appropriate comments not covered in other paragraphs on reserves, reinforcements, new tactics, weapons and equipment, administrative installations, and combat service support. Also includes appropriate technical intelligence.)

3. **ORDER OF BATTLE.** Frequently, this paragraph will only consist of references to the enemy situation map (or overlay) and the order of battle annex, which is developed using the format shown below. When desired by the commander, particularly significant order of battle changes may be summarized in addition to being discussed in detail in the order of battle annex.

a. **Composition and disposition.**

b. **Strength.** (Personnel and major weapons and items of equipment.)

(1) **Losses.**

(2) **Current strength.**

c. **Tactics.**

d. **Training.**

e. **Combat Service Support.**

f. **Combat Effectiveness.**

g. **Miscellaneous Data.**

4. **COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.** This paragraph, or parts thereof, should be issued as an annex if a limited distribution is required.

a. **General.** (A short summary of the counterintelligence situation during the period.)

b. **Espionage.**

c. **Sabotage.**

d. **Subversion.**

e. **Communications and Noncommunications Security.**

f. **Miscellaneous.**

5. **WEATHER.** This paragraph gives a summary of the effect of weather on operations during the period.

6. **TERRAIN.** Use an annex, special maps, and overlays when possible. Include impact on future operations, if appropriate.

7. **ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION.** This paragraph lists and briefly discusses enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities. The conclusions present the commander's assessment of the most probable courses of action available to the enemy, in order of probability, adoption, and vulnerabilities exploitable by his own, higher, or lower echelons.

a. **Enemy Capabilities.**

b. **Enemy Vulnerabilities.**

c. **Conclusions.**

Authentication:

**Annexes:** (Any intelligence document may be distributed as an annex to a PERINTREP. Although annexes are a means of distributing detailed intelligence and information, care is exercised to avoid unnecessary bulk and duplication.)

Distribution:

**(Classification)**



## APPENDIX C

# FORMAT AND EXAMPLE ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX TO PERINTREP FORMAT

**Format of Order of Battle Annex. Omit items not applicable and renumber remaining paragraphs.**

**(Classification)**

### ORDER OF BATTLE

Annex\_\_\_\_ , (OB) to PERINTREP NO.\_\_\_\_ ,\_\_\_\_ , Corps\_\_\_\_

1. **COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION** (see appendix 1, overlay). An overlay is usually attached to present the graphic display of enemy units. The initial subparagraphs always contain information pertaining to organization. Information concerning identification and disposition is listed by mentioning the highest echelons first, followed by subordinate units from left to right, or top to bottom, as displayed on the overlay. Related items may be combined and presented in a single entry.
2. **STRENGTH.** Report information pertaining to enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment losses during the period. Replacement rates and strength figures of individual units may be listed.
3. **TACTICS.** Report only new tactics and deviations from prescribed tactical doctrine.
4. **TRAINING.** Report new development and recent changes in training programs or methods of special training undertaken by the enemy since the initiation of hostilities.
5. **LOGISTICS.** Report those items which will affect current enemy operations such as supply status, supply systems, and locations of supply facilities.
6. **COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.** Report data on the combat effectiveness of enemy units, either of the entire force or of a major tactical unit. List items indicating morale, esprit, quality of troops and commanders. The ability of the enemy unit to accomplish its expected mission is expressed.
7. **MISCELLANEOUS DATA.** List personalities, unit history, field post office (FPO), code numbers and names, order of battle changes, and any other item of order of battle intelligence that cannot be properly inserted in preceding paragraphs.

Acknowledge.(**SIGNATURE**)

Appendixes:

Distribution:

OFFICIAL

(NAME OF G2)

**(Classification)**

## APPENDIX D

# ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX

(Classification)

Annex B (OB) to PARENTERAL 29, 3 Corps, 201800Z August 19

## ORDER OF BATTLE

(Classification)

### 1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, Overlay).

- a. All EPW captured during period are from Aggressor 2d Combined Arms Army. Unit identification include: (C-1)

<u>17 MRD</u>	<u>17 MRD</u>	<u>32 MRD</u>
283 MRR	144 MRR	132 Med TK Regt
290 MRR	142 MRR	
	130 TK Regt	
	130 Recon Bn	

**COMMENT:** 32 MRD accepted as being organic to 2d CAA. 52 TK Div previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.

- b. Two large missile-type weapons mounted on large amphibious armored carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vic TMP 420513. (B-2).

**COMMENT:** Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously unlocated.

- c. Captured enemy field order reveals plan to attach 4080 TK Div to 2d CAA, effective 22 Aug. (B-1).

**COMMENT:** EPW previously reported 40th MTD moving to reinforce 2d CAA. Enemy main effort probably planned for this area.

### 2. STRENGTH.

Enemy losses reported during period:

	<u>EPW</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>ARTY</u>	<u>ARMOR</u>	<u>AIR</u>	<u>VEH</u>
16 MTD	37	302	2	4	1	21
30 MRR	16	52	8	1		16
32 MRR	<u>8</u>	<u>12</u>	=	=	=	<u>4</u>
Total III US Corps Sector	61	366	10	5	1	41

**COMMENT:** The marked increase in personnel losses during the period have been sustained primarily by enemy combat patrols. Aircraft loss was H1, Observation Helicopter equipped with aeronautics radar. Overall strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.

### 3. TACTICS.

- a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state they have been instructed in the event their units are cut off to continue fighting as guerrilla units or in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much US Army property as possible gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (C-6)

**COMMENT:** Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear areas can be expected if elements of these units are cut off.

b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for battalion, company and platoon commanders, written by G/D Griboyedov, entitled "Tanks Out Front" (appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting US patrols and advancing forces to pass through aggressor lines. A coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and rear elements with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining US forces. (B-2)

**COMMENT:** Considering enemy doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm, the above is possible, particularly in view of reports of probable employment of 40 TK Div (para 1).

#### **4. TRAINING.**

a. Reference paragraph 3b.

b. Indications of enemy concern for COMSEC is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio security and communications procedures. (B-2)

**COMMENT:** MI unit confirms enemy lack of radio discipline and states that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief operations. Numerous enemy security violations have been noted since 17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.

#### **5. LOGISTICS.**

a. EPW states enemy supply personnel have recently contacted local merchants, farmers, and fisherman for supplies of most Class I items. (C-6)

**COMMENT:** Enemy either has critical shortage of Class I items or has a bottleneck in the supply system requiring local procurement of these items.

b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported enemy stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of frontline division. (B-2)

**COMMENT:** Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet undetermined. Would indicate enemy may be planning major offensive soon.

#### **6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.**

a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state morale is high but senior officers are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while the 32 MRD and 56 TK Div have, until recently, been assigned less hazardous missions. (F-6)

**COMMENT:** Analysis of unit history and recent operations of enemy 2d CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and the fact 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mech Div has not been engaged in combat with US forces in this campaign.

b. EPW reports 30 MRD to be redesignated 30 "Fusilier" Mech Div for superior combat record. (F-6)

**COMMENT:** US III Corps rates combat effectiveness of 56 MRD from excellent to outstanding in comparison to other enemy divisions in same sector. 30 MRD casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.

## 7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.

### a. Personalities Identified by EPW: (C-1)

CG, 40th TK Div	G/D GRIBOYEDOV, Semyon P (Ref 36)
CO, 282 MRR	COL CARDUCCI, Gherardo S.
CO, 283 MRR	COL UNDSET, Bjornstjerne (Acting CO)
CO, 130 MTR	COL STENWYK, Martin J.
CO, 132 MTR	COL MATTEZ, Mario

**COMMENT:** Confirms previously obtained information.

b. Unit History: Officer EPW stated his unit (32 MRD) trained extensively in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F-6)

**COMMENT:** Special training received by 32 MRD should increase its overall effectiveness when employed in river-crossing operations. No evidence of other units so trained.

c. Field Post Numbers: Captured document reveal enemy field post numbers being used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and last three digits are transposed. Field post number of 46 MRD will appear as 75301 instead of 31750.

**COMMENT:** Enemy has used this system previously as a security measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different patterns during future operations.

### Acknowledge.

LEE

LTG

Appendixes: 1-Enemy Disp Overlay

2-Enemy Army Org Chart

3-Enemy Training Pamphlet.

Distribution: Same as PARENTAL 29

OFFICIAL

GRANT

G2

**(Classification)**

## APPENDIX E

# Sample of a Division Intelligence Estimate

### (Classification)

Copy No \_\_\_\_ of \_\_\_\_ Copies  
G2 Section, 52d Infantry Division (Mech)  
Glenville (NF3277), EASTLAND  
230830Z June 19\_\_

### (Classification)

## INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 20

Reference: Map series EASTLAND, sheets DELTA through KILO, edition 2, 1:50,000.

1. **MISSION.** 52d Division conducts mobile defense along DRY CREEK, accepts no penetration south of HILLS 333 and 421, and prepares to conduct offensive operations within 12 hours.

### 2. **BATTLEFIELD AREA.**

#### a. Weather.

(1) Existing situation. Weather for the period 23 June to 28 June will be rainy, and cool, gradually warming and clearing as a high pressure system moves through the area of operations from the south. Temperatures from 40 degrees F to 65 degree F. Visibility will range from 16 to 25 kilometers, except during precipitation and in morning fog in low drainage areas. Surface winds from the south 8 to 10 knots.

<u>Date</u>	<u>BM- NT</u>	<u>BM- CT</u>	<u>EE- CT</u>	<u>EE- NT</u>	<u>Moon- Rise</u>	<u>Moon- Set</u>
23 June	0331	0419	2029	2130	1746	0125
25 June	0339	0422	2025	2124	1907	0214
27 June	0344	0425	2022	2118	2001	0518
28 June	0349	0428	2018	2112	2022	0820

#### (2) Effects on enemy courses of action:

(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross-country movement except in the low drainage areas of MINERTOWN.

(b) Southerly winds will not affect enemy employment of Nuclear Biological and Chemical.

(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will favor attack.

(3) Effects on friendly courses of action.

(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross-country movement except in the low drainage areas of MINERTOWN.

(b) Southerly wind direction will not affect friendly use of chemical or nuclear weapons.

(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will not favor friendly defense.

b. Terrain.

(1) Existing situation.

(a) Concealment and cover. Wooded areas around MIDWAY offer good concealment. Numerous ravines in drainage areas of MINERTOWN offer limited concealment and cover.

(b) Observation and fire. There are good observation points along bluffs above GRINGO River. Fields of fire are excellent throughout plains area north of MUD CREEK but limited moderately in populated and vegetated areas near GLENNVILLE.

(c) Obstacles.

1 SWIFT River (fordable 1 kilometer east of GLENNVILLE).

2 Bluffs above GRINGO River.

3 City of GLENNVILLE. Routes around city are passable; routes through city are impassable.

(d) Key terrain. Hill mass MUKELROY and HILL 333.

(e) Avenues of approach.

1 Available to the enemy into our sector:

a Avenue of approach 1 is from LARGO through gap around the northeast end of HILL 702, 34 kilometers southwest to MINERTOWN and south to DRY CREEK.

b Avenue of approach 2 is from LARGO southeast through MIDWAY to river-crossing east of GLENNVILLE.

2 Avenue of approach available for US movement into enemy area will be generally the same as those listed for enemy into our sector.

(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Terrain favors the enemy attack using avenue of approach 1.

(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Terrain favors our defense of the area around DRY CREEK.

c. Other Characteristics.

- (1) Existing situation. Local nationals throughout the area favor friendly military operations. Large numbers of refugees can be expected to pass through friendly lines.
- (2) Effect on enemy courses of action. The enemy can be expected to insert infiltrators as refugees.
- (3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Refugees can be expected to provide valuable intelligence.

**3. ENEMY SITUATION.**

a. Disposition. Annex A, Situation Overlay.

b. Composition. Enemy forces opposing 52d Infantry Division(Mech) consist of elements of the 4th Combined Arms Army.

(1) Identified units are:

(a) 10 MRD consisting of:

27th MRR  
30th MRR  
31st MRR  
121st TK Regt (unlocated)

(b) 19th Mech Div Consisting of:

23d MRR  
37th TK Regt

(2) Unidentified units are: 2XU/IMRR of 19th MRD

c. Strength.

(1) Committed forces. 52d Infantry Division (Mech) is opposed immediately by 4 motorized rifle battalions and 1 tank battalion. These units are supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.

(2) Reinforcements. Reinforcements available to the enemy for commitment in our zone are a total of 5 motorized rifle battalions and 4 tank battalions from the 27th MRR, 121st TK Regt, and the second echelon battalions of the 30 and 31st MRRs and the 37 TK Regt. Also, the 23 MRR can totally reinforce within 8 hours from start of movement.

(3) Air. Enemy is supported by the 3d Air Army consisting of unidentified numbers of fighter-bomber aircraft, ground attack aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft. Air parity currently exists with either force capable of obtaining air superiority for limited periods of time. Up to now enemy has used a maximum of 60 fighter-bomber sorties in a 12-hour period.

(4) Nuclear. No estimate of the enemy's nuclear support for the next 30 days is available. Enemy currently has 152mm Sp How with nuclear rounds and SSM which can deliver rounds of 10-50 KT yield within range of our division.

d. Recent and Present Significant Activities.

(1) Air reconnaissance and photo reports indicate increased enemy movement along axis BRAVO to LIMA. movement indicates reinforcement of forward element of 4th CAA.

(2) Enemy's aerial recon and tactical air flights have increased in the last 36 hours, particularly in the line of contact.

(3) For the past 36 hours, volume of vehicular traffic has increased in southerly direction.

(4) Artillery fire from the enemy has become more intensive in the last 24 hours.

(5) Reliable source reports large tracked, amphibious vehicles moving into area vicinity HILL 805.

(6) Enemy has begun to employ smoke along the forward slope of HILL 702.

e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.

(1) Personnel. Enemy, units are presently estimated to be at 85% to 90% authorized strength. Morale is high, although replacements may not be highly trained.

(2) Intelligence. Enemy stresses communications security and subordinate units of the 4th CAA have recently initiated intensive radio security and procedures training.

(3) Operations.

(a) Enemy is susceptible to mine warfare and antitank weapons.

(b) Enemy has trained heavily on attack formations and has been told offensive action is the only way to victory.

(c) Enemy is vulnerable to nuclear weapons due to massed forces and canalization by further advancement.

(4) Logistics. Supplies are adequate for the enemy's conduct of either the offense or defense. The enemy had previously stockpiled supplies well forward in division areas.

(5) Personalities. G/D Masonski, CG of the 10th MRD, is an advocate of penetration type offense on a narrow front with subsequent widening of the gaps to split enemy forces.

#### 4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.

a. Enumeration:

(1) Attack at any time along sense of approach 1 with 4 motorized rifle battalions and 1 tank battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.



(2) Attack at any time along avenue of approach 2 with 4 motorized rifle battalions and 1 tank battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.

(3) Defend at any time with forces in contact supported by all available division and regimental artillery.

(4) Reinforce his attack or defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PLACE</u>	<u>TIME</u>
(a) 30th MRR (-)	Avenue of approach 2	immediately
(b) 31st MRR (-)	Avenue of approach 1	immediately
(c) 37th TK Regt (-)	Avenue of approach 1	immediately
(d) 27th MRR (-)	Avenue of approach 1 or 2	2 hr after start of movement
(e) 23 MRR	vic LITTLE	8 hr after start of movement
(f) 121st TK Regt	Unlocated	Unknown
(g) U/I MRR of 19th MRD	vic BRAVO	9 hr after start of movement

(5) Delay in successive positions to the east of LITTLE.

(6) Employ chemical agents within our sector at any time.

(7) Employ nuclear weapons of a 0.5-50 KT yield with delivery by artillery or SSM.

(8) Employ guerrilla forces in our rear area either alone or in conjunction with the capabilities enumerated below.

(9) The enemy can attack our area with an undetermined number of fighter, ground attack, and bomb sorties daily. The maximum number of daily sorties mounted in our area has been 60.

#### b. Analysis and Discussion.

(1) Attack along avenue of approach 1.

(a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:

1 Uses a good avenue of approach.

2 The enemy is massing motorized rifle elements, tanks, artillery and logistic support along this avenue.

3 Forward elements dispersed on a relatively narrow front.

4 Extensive artillery preparation along approach.

(b) The scant cover presented along this avenue of approach is a limiting factor but does not preclude adoption of this capability.

(2) Attack along avenue of approach 2.

- (a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:
  - 1 The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks, artillery and logistics support along this avenue.
  - 2 Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow front.
  - 3 Extensive artillery preparation along this avenue.
- (b) The following indicate rejection of this capability:
  - 1 This avenue of approach accommodates only one deployed regiment and offers limited cover and concealment.
  - 2 The limited obstacle presented by GLENNVILLE.
- (3) Defend. The following indicate rejection of this capability:
  - (a) The enemy is massing his forces along the line of contact.
  - (b) Enemy has followed known doctrine for attack.
  - (c) Terrain favors attack.
- (4) Reinforce. The following indicate adoption of this capability:
  - (a) Movement of additional troops toward the front.
  - (b) New units identified in the combat zone.
  - (c) Forward logistical buildup.
- (5) Delay. There are no indications of the enemy's adoption of this capability.
- (6) Use chemical agents. There is no indication the enemy will employ chemical agents other than smoke.
- (7) Use nuclear weapons. There is no indication the enemy will use nuclear weapons.
- (8) Use guerrilla forces. The following indicates adoption of this capability:
  - (a) Doctrine calls for use of guerrilla force.
  - (b) Use would enhance enemy advance by creating panic and confusion.
- (9) Air attack. Indications are the enemy will continue to use this capability as referenced in paragraph (9) above.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS.

- a. Intelligence. Available intelligence indicates that the division can accomplish its mission. Intelligence support adoption of the division course of action.
- b. Weather and Terrain. The weather and terrain favors our defense. The best defensive area is the high ground east of Dry Creek. The best avenue of approach into our defensive sector is avenue of approach 1.

c. Probable enemy courses of action.

(1) Attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery with the main attack of one motorized rifle regiment along avenue of approach 1. Will reinforce with elements as indicated in para 4a(4).

(2) Conduct secondary attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery with one mechanized regiment along avenue of approach 2.

(3) Employ guerrilla or special forces in our rear areas in conjunction with the above courses of action.

d. Enemy Vulnerabilities.

(1) The Enemy is vulnerable to counterattack since he has been slow to exploit potential penetrations.

(2) Vulnerable to nuclear attack due to massing of troops and concentrated logistics depots.

(3) Mine warfare will be effective against mechanized elements.

KROOK

BG

OFFICIAL:

/S/ Bagger

BAGGER

GS

Annex: A - Situation Overlay (omitted)

Distribution: A

**(Classification)**

## APPENDIX F

# SAMPLE OF A DIVISION INTELLIGENCE ANNEX

Copy No 4 of 5 copies  
20th Inf Div  
ZELLE (4671), BUTTANO  
101900Z September 19\_\_  
BQ 13

### (Classification)

Annex A (Intelligence) to Operations Order 24

Reference: Map, BUTTANO, Edition 2, 1:50,000 sheets 204 (ZELLE PAGT.)

1. **SUMMARY OF ENEMY SITUATION.** See INTSUM, this HQ, 101800 September, and Appendix 1, Situation Overlay.

### 2. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.

#### a. PIR.

(1) Will enemy reinforce his forces along the FLOOD River before the time of attack? If so, when, where, and with what forces? Special attention to the mechanized regiment and the medium tank regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(2) Will enemy employ nuclear weapons against us? If so, when, where, how many, of what yields, and by what delivery means?

#### b. IR.

(1) Will enemy continue to defend in his present position? If so, how will he organize his forces on the ground, and with what troops? Special attention to locations and activities of reserves, and vulnerability to nuclear attack.

(2) Will enemy attack prior to 110500Z September? If so, when, where, and what strength? Special attention to the axis HILL536--HILL 524--CR9841.

(3) Will enemy use CB agent? If so, what agents, when, how, and where?

### 3. INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS

#### a. Orders to attached and subordinate units.

(1) 1st Bde.

(2) 2d Bde.

(a) Report as obtained--

1 Status of construction of defensive positions and mine fields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

2 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

3 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy position in division zone.

4 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.

5 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling in forward areas.

6 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

7 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400Z September.

1 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

2 Location and activity of motorized and rifle regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(3) 3d Bde.

(a) Report as obtained--

1 Activity of mechanized rifle battalion north and east of CR9847.

2 Activity of mechanized battalion on HILL 503.

3 Status of construction of defensive positions and mine fields on and to the east of FLOOD River.

4 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

5 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy position in division zone.

6 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols

7 Activity and size of units blocking our patrolling

8 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

9 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400Z September.

1 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

2 Location and activity of motorized rifle regiment in vicinity of BURG.

(4) 1/21 Cav Report as obtained--

- (a) Activity of motorized rifle battalion on HILL 503.
- (b) Status of construction of defensive positions and mine fields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.
- (c) Location and size of ammunition storage sites and location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.
- (d) Clearing of lanes through obstacles with enemy position in division zone.
- (e) Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed.
- (f) Activity and size of units blocking our patrol in forward areas.
- (g) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.
- (h) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(5) Div ARTY.

(a) Report as obtained--

- 1 Status of construction of defensive positions and mine fields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.
- 2 Clearing of lanes through obstacles within enemy position in division zone.
- 3 Number, size, and composition of enemy patrols, and time they were observed or contacted.
- 4 Activity and size of unit blocking our patrolling in forward areas.
- 5 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400Z September. Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of position.

(6) 20th Avn.

(a) Report as obtained--

- 1 Activity of mechanized rifle battalion
- 2 Activity of motorized rifle battalion on HILL 503.
- 3 Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of HILL 536 (north of BURG).

4 Status of construction of defensive positions and mine fields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

5 Location and size of ammunition sites, location, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

6 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, atomic demolition munitions (ADM).

7 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

(b) Report as obtained. Negative reports by 110400ZSeptember.

1 Movement on the following roads:

a North on Highway 25.

b West on Highway 2.

c West on Highway 4.

2 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

3 Location and activity of motorized rifle regiment in vicinity of BURG.

4 Location of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

(7) 20th Engr. Report as obtained--

(a) Status of construction of defensive positions and mine- fields on and to the east of the FLOOD River.

(b) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

b. Requests to higher, adjacent, and cooperating units.

(1) 1st Corps is requested to provide:

(a) As obtained--

1 Location, size, and type of unit in vicinity of HILL 536 (north of BURG).

2 Number, types, direction of movement, and time of movement of air or surface vehicular traffic within the division zone, with special attention to Highway2.

3 Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.

4 Evidence of field fortifications and troop concentrations along the following lines:

a HILL 503 - CR9847.

b HILL 518 - HILL 536 - HILL 499.

5 Location and size of ammunition storage sites and locations, size, and content of engineer equipment parks.

6 Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement. Special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.

7 Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

8 Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.

9 Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.

10 Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.

11 Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to ADM.

12 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.

13 All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.

14 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained: negative reports by 110400Z September.

1 Movement on the following roads:

a North on Highway 25.

b West on Highway 2.

c West on Highway 4.

2 Activity in medium tank regiment (-) and tank battalion assembly area in vicinity of BURG.

3 Location and activity of mechanized regiment in vicinity of BURG.

4 Location and activity of mechanized regiment southwest of CR 9944.

5 Locations of artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.

6 Command posts, supply points, and medical facilities east of Highway 25.



- (2) 18th Inf Div is requested to provide--

(a) As obtained--

- 1 Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.
- 2 Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement; special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.
- 3 Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.
- 4 Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.
- 5 Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.
- 6 Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.
- 7 Locations of heavy artillery positions, including number of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.
- 8 Preparation of emplacement suitable for and presence of equipment appropriate to ADM.
- 9 The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.
- 10 All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.
- 11 The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(b) As obtained; negative reports by 110400Z September.

1 Movement on the following roads:

- a North of Highway 25.
- b West on Highway 2.
- c West on Highway 4.

(2) Location and activity of mechanized regiment vicinity of BURG.

(3) 52d Mech Inf Div is requested to provide as obtained--

- (a) Troop concentrations, including types of vehicles, east of Highway 25 within the divisional area of interest.
- (b) Instances of heavily guarded vehicular movement; special attention to Highway 2 from ZILCH to BURG.
- (c) Areas under unusual security restrictions in the divisional area of interest.

- (d) Presence of special security troop units in any area east of Highway 25.
- (e) Any location in the divisional area of interest from which civilians have been evacuated.
- (f) Launcher sites for guided missiles or rockets within divisional area of interest.
- (g) Locations of heavy artillery positions, including user of weapons, caliber, and state of preparation of positions.
- (h) Preparation of emplacements suitable for, and presence of equipment appropriate to, ADM.
- (i) The interception of enemy patrols equipped for CB activity.
- (j) All CB supply movement and dumping in zone.
- (k) The presence of enemy troops carrying protective masks and/or wearing protective clothing.

(4) Supporting MI units provide information obtainable from Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Electronic Support (ES) and will respond to specific tasking as described in separate instructions.

#### **4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS, AND MATERIAL (See Division SOP).**

#### **5. DOCUMENTS AND EQUIPMENT REQUIRED**

- a. Maps. SOP distribution of map, BUTTANO, 1:50,000, ZELLE-PAGT.
- b. Photographic. Following aerial photographs will be furnished:
  - (1) Basic cover of division zone (1:10,000 approximate), six copies of each brigade and DIVARTY; one copy each tank battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, 1/21th Cav, division engineer, aviation battalion or group, and division signal officer.
  - (2) Annotated air photographs distributed automatically, as available.

#### **6. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE**

- a. Appendix 2, Counterintelligence.
- b. All units coordinate use of Army aircraft through division tactical operations center (DTOC) to minimize number of aircraft in air over division zone prior to attack.

**7. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.** Effective 110800Z September units will submit INTSUM at 0800, 1200, 1600, 2000, 2400, and 0400 hours daily in lieu of times prescribed in division SOP.

#### **8. Miscellaneous INSTRUCTIONS (as required).**

None.

Acknowledge.

POWERS

MG

Appendixes: 1-Situation Overlay

2-Counterintelligence

Distribution: Same as OPORD\_\_\_\_\_

OFFICIAL:

/s/AUSTIN

AUSTIN

G2

NOTE: This format may also be used in Joint Service Operations.

**(Classification)**

## APPENDIX G

# INDICATES OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(Extracted from FM 34-3)

Indicators are any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or any characteristic of the BA that points toward enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, or intentions. Individual indicators cannot stand alone. Each indicator must be integrated with other factors and indicators before patterns can be detected and enemy intentions established.

Indicators are developed by the ASSISI analysts who are assisted by other TOC elements in the G2 or S2 section. All indicators are developed to answer the commander's PIR and IR. The analyst uses indicators to correlate particular events or activities with probable enemy courses of action. Indicators are also used to determine what events or activities must occur for any enemy to follow a particular course of action. The ability to read indicators (including recognition of enemy deception indicators) contributes to the success of friendly operations.

Enemy deception operations provide indicators in an attempt to create false or misleading patterns of enemy intentions. Analysts must be able to detect these false indicators and then determine what actual courses of action the enemy is attempting to initiate. Enemy attempts at deception can be discovered by comparing indicators, intelligence, and combat information from all sources to arrive at an accurate picture of the battlefield.

The following list contains different types of intelligence indicators. This list of indicators is by no means complete, nor is it intended to apply to all situations or all types of enemy forces. It gives some types of indicators which, when incorporated with other indicators, can create patterns or suggest a series of activities which point to typical enemy activities or courses of action.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Massing of motorized elements, tanks, artillery, and logistical support.	Areas of secondary importance are often denuded to mass maximum strength the main effort.
Deployment of combat element (motorized rifle, armor, antitank) echelons on a relatively narrow frontage.	Normal attack formation provides for the second echelon of the regiment to be located 5-15 kilometers in the rear of the first echelon, on-line; and the division second echelon 15-30 kilometers in the rear of the first echelon.
Forward units disposed on relatively narrow fronts and depths.	A MRRs breakthrough zone is from 2-4 kilo meters within an assigned attack frontage, which varies from 3-8 kilometers. MRR headquarters located approximately 4 kilometers from the FLOT during normal attack posture.
Concentration of mass toward either or both flanks within first echelon defensive area.	Single or double envelopment normally is attempted in the offense. Tanks and motorizedunits on either or both flanks may indicate single or double envelopment.

Demonstrations and feints.	Local, small-scale attacks or demonstrations involving motorized rifle units, tanks, and artillery frequently precede a general attack.
Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.	Counterreconnaissance screens are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of troop movement, or regrouping of forces to be used in the attack.
Forward movement of hostile units.	Before launching an attack, troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy.
Increased patrolling (ground reconnaissance).	Patrolling by motorized rifle units usually is more active before an attack.
Forward CPs located close to the FLOT. Other CPs move forward.	Preceding an attack, an auxiliary CP is established, if needed, by Army/Front. The division main CP is located 5-15 kilometers from the FLOT; the regiment main CP is located 2-3 kilometers from the FLOT; and the battalion CP/OP is located 500-1,000 meters from the FLOT.
Locating division-sized operational maneuver group at Army; Army-sized OMG at front.	OMGs are formed preceding an offensive operation. They are generally (OMG) committed before the conclusion of the 1st echelon battle and operate independently of the main forces. OMG use a separate axis of advance from the main body.
Massing of artillery units.	Larger than normal RAGs, DAGs, and AAGs indicate initiation of main attack. enemy norms are 60-100 tubes per kilometer of frontage against well-prepared defenses for main attack; 60-80 tubes per kilometer of frontage against hasty defenses for main attack; and 40 tubes per kilometers frontage for secondary attack. The RAG is usually located 1-4 kilometers from the FLOT; the DAG usually 3-6 kilometers from the FLOT; and the AAG is usually more than 6 kilometers from the FLOT. TMS-65 are within 4 kilometers of the FLOT for smoke operations.
Extensive artillery preparation of upto 50 minutes in duration.	The offense is built around the striking power and shock of massed artillery. Preparations of 1/2 to 1 hour normally precede an offensive.
Dispersal of tanks and self-propelled howitzers to units.	Tanks accompanying leading waves of assault motorized units--with motorized self-propelled howitzers following the tanks closely, by bounds.
Movement of fire/missile control radars forward.	Enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) control radars require time to be set up and oriented. The enemy prefers to establish SAM capability before moving other forces forward. In the event of the arrival of the second echelon, control radars are established to allow for an overlap of coverage as the first echelon moves their SAM radars forward in the offense.

FROG/SS-21/SS-23/SCUD units located forward.	Enemy offensive operations also occur in-depth. Forward movement of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) puts friendly airfields and depots in jeopardy.
ZSU-23-4s located in forward areas (2 to 4).	Medium air defense guns are displaced before attack to protect assault forces and to facilitate forward displacement during the attack. ZSU 23-4s protecting the RAG are approximately 1.25 kilometers to the rear of the FLOT.
Increased air reconnaissance.	Air reconnaissance usually is more active before an attack.
Systematic air bombardment.	Before the attack, the enemy may engage in the systematic "softening up" of key positions by bombardment.
Establishment of auxiliary airfields or activation of inactive air fields.	Buildup of logistics and maintenance capability indicates increased capability support offense.
Clearing lanes through obstacles within own position.	Lanes are cleared and marked through mined area, and ramps and bridges prepared over ditches and trenches within enemy's own position. This is done before attack to facilitate forward movement and grouping, particularly at night.
Reconnaissance and destruction of obstacles that are part of our defenses.	Usually on the night preceding an attack, enemy patrols reconnoiter friendly obstacles to determine a plan for clearing lanes. The patrol destroys only such obstacles that will not disclose the direction of the main attack.
River assault crossing units located forward (providing there is a water obstacle).	Amphibious, bridge, and other engineer units with water-crossing capabilities are located near the FLOT and also echeloned to the rear. They are also collocated with other tactical units of the attacking force.
Airborne/airmobile/air assault attacks on our rear area.	The enemy conducts offensive operations throughout the depth of the defense. Heliborne attacks are also made to facilitate difficult operations, like river-crossings.
Increased enemy agent activity in rear area.	The enemy attempts to prevent or disrupt the forward movement of friendly supplies, equipment, maintenance, and reinforcements.
Extensive efforts to destroy nuclear storage areas and delivery systems by air, artillery, and sabotage.	Enemy doctrine calls for the elimination of friendly nuclear weapons by any means. The enemy considers that we are more likely to use nuclear weapons when we are in the defense.
Movement of noncombatants out the combat zone.	Noncombatants hinder rapid forward movement of follow-on forces.
Conducting drills and rehearsals rear areas.	Major attacks may be preceded by in drills or rehearsals. This is particularly true of attacks against fortified positions or strongly defended river lines.

Increased activity in rear areas.	Before an attack, supply and administrative activities increase in the rear areas.
Traffic control units marking routes to the FLOT.	Traffic control points are employed throughout the march routes to facilitate march formations. Allied border guards assist by controlling traffic through the barrier areas of the borders.
Forward placement of supply and evacuation installations.	Supply and evacuation installations usually are well forward for an attack. Technical observation points are established close to the FLOT. Repair and evacuation groups are located at assembly points close to the FLOT to repair/evacuate damaged vehicles. The division supply dump (ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), ration) is located 25-30 kilometers from FLOT. The regimental ammunition supply point is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT; the regimental repair points is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT; the regimental POL point is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT, and the regimental rations point is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT. Battalion ammunition and rations supply points are located 4 kilometers from the FLOT. The division repair point for wheeled vehicles is located 10-14 kilometers from the FLOT. Rear control points for the front are located 150-200 kilometers from the FLOT; for the Army are 25-40 kilometers from the FLOT; for the division is 20 kilometers from the FLOT; and for the regiment are 20 kilometers from the FLOT.
Location of maintenance parties lateral routes.	When the enemy conducts a march, he establishes several maintenance parties on lateral routes to facilitate march operations.
Medical points/stations move forward.	Medical units move forward before an offensive operation to support anticipated medical and evacuation requirements. Division medical points/stations are located 10-14 kilometers from the FLOT; the regimental medical points/station at 10-14 kilometers from the FLOT; and the battalion medical points/station at 1.5-3 kilometers from the FLOT.
Radio silence on nets organic division.	The enemy attempts to deny us the information which can be developed from intercepting his radio traffic.
Abnormal logistics traffic on command nets.	To expedite supplies to units about to conduct a main attack, commanders may get personally involved.
Dummy traffic in radio nets to cover unit moves.	The enemy will attempt to deceive us about the location of his sources.
Deception operations to cover unit movement.	Same as above.
Extensive smoke operations.	Smoke operations mask the movement of units during the period immediately preceding an attack.

SIGINT/jamming assets located well forward.	SIGINT and jamming assets will move forward to within 2-4 kilometers of the FEBA before attack.
Extensive spot and barrage jamming of our frontline units' communications nets, as well as communications systems associated with tactical air control systems.	Extensive jamming will precede an offense to cause the maximum disruption of our command control, and communications. However, jamming will cease when enemy forces reach our main defense area to prevent interference with their own communications systems.
Preparation of battalion and company defense areas consisting of company and platoon strongpoints.	Defense is based on holding prepared defensive areas and counterattacks by tank-heavy forces.
Extensive preparation of field fortifications.	The enemy makes extensive use of trenches, prepared positions, and overhead cover in defensive operations.
Formation of antitank (AT) strongpoints in depth along logical avenues of approach.	AT strongpoints are formed along in depth along approach for armor. These are made up of motorized rifle, engineer, and AT gun/missile units with positions strengthened by mines, ditches, and other obstacles.
Attachment of additional AT units to frontline defensive positions.	In areas where there is a serious armored threat, the enemy will concentrate as many as 25 AT guns for every 1,000 meters of front.
Preparation of alternate artillery Positions.	In normal defensive operations, three positions are prepared for each firing battery.
Employment of roving artillery.	Roving guns are part of normal defensive operations.
Large tank heavy units located in assembly areas to the rear.	Tank units are held in assembly areas for employment in counterattacks.
Preparation and occupation of defensive positions.	In the defense, a security zone and main defense area are prepared and occupied.
Presence of demolitions, contaminated areas, obstacles, minefields.	Demolitions, minefields, and other obstacles are placed to cover and approaches to the position.
Deployment of motorized rifle units on good defensive positions. Preparation of company strongpoint on key terrain.	Dominating terrain that has good fields of fire and is relatively inaccessible to tanks usually is selected for a defensive position.
Prestocking ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment and fortification of buildings.	Prestocking ammunition reduces the load on logistics throughout the system once the battle begins. Engineer tools and equipment may be used to dig trenches and to erect obstacles.
Entrenching and erecting bands of wire.	Digging of trenches and the erection of wire indicate preparations to hold the position.
Presence of dummy artillery observation points.	Dummy artillery observation points preserve the effectiveness of the actual artillery positions by deceiving us as to their location.
Presence of dummy CPs.	Same as above.
Increased activity of SIGINT/ES units.	Increased activity is an attempt to gain information but decreased activity of EC units about us before the



	attack.
Early warning sites hardened.	When early warning sites are hardened, it indicates the intention of those forces to remain in place and to protect an important facility.
CPs placed in hardened facility.	Same as above.
Additional AT units attached to first echelon maneuver units.	The enemy puts great emphasis on killing tanks early. The enemy believes that if the tanks can be stopped, the attack will fail.
Establishment of a security zone.	A security zone is established to enable fortifications to be constructed away from immediate danger from our artillery and direct-fire weapons.
Forward units disposed on relatively wide fronts and depths compared to offensive posture.	The defense zone of an MRR varies from 10 to 15 kilometers depending upon terrain and the combat availability of forces. MRR depth varies from 7 to 10 kilometers.
Displacement of CPs towards to the rear.	CPs move further to the rear reduce the chances that they will be overrun or destroyed during the initial phase of the battle.
Displacement of logistics and medical units towards the rear.	Logistics and medical units are displaced to the rear to facilitate combat force defense and counterattack operations.
Displacement of artillery and SSM toward units towards the rear.	Artillery units are displaced toward rear to reduce the change that these units will be lost/destroyed during the preliminary stages of the battle. During the defense, deep fires are not as critical as during the offense.
Presence of large AT reserves with mobile obstacle detachments (MOD).	Large AT reserves are established (with mobile obstacles (MOD) to provide AT capability.
Decreased communications intercepts (due to increased use of wire).	The enemy uses wire in the defense to increase security.
Air defense systems located in rear areas.	Destruction of logistics, command, and artillery units are high-priority missions for our deep attacks.

## **MARCH TO CONTACT INDICATORS**

<b>ACTIVITY</b>	<b>EXPLANATION</b>
Increased air and ground reconnaissance along mobility corridors.	Accurate information about routes speeds the advance.
Road junctions, bridges, and other key features are occupied.	The enemy wants to control highspeed armor avenues of approach into our key areas.
Increased counterreconnaissance activity.	Counterreconnaissance is an attempt to prevent us from gaining information about his

	dispositions and movements.
Forward movement of columns dispersed laterally in two or more mobility corridors.	The enemy prefers to use search formation when moving to contact.

### **REINFORCEMENT INDICATORS**

<b>ACTIVITY</b>	<b>EXPLANATION</b>
Movement of additional troops toward the front.	This action increases enemy's present strength.
Increased traffic toward present position.	Increased traffic brings up additional troops, equipment, and supplies.
Identification of new units in the combat zone.	The presence of new units--in addition to units already present--increases enemy's strength.
Additional CPs and supply and evacuation installations.	Presence of additional units causes an increase in the number of these installations.
Logistical installations moved well forward.	Indicates preparation for counterattacks after reinforcement.

### **DELAYING ACTION INDICATORS**

<b>ACTIVITY</b>	<b>EXPLANATION</b>
Withdrawal from defensive position(s) becoming heavily engaged.	In delaying actions, units avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Successive local counterattacks with limited objectives.	Counterattacks are employed to assist in disengaging first echelon units, rather than to restore position.
Counterattacks broken off before position is restored.	Same as above.
Maximum firepower positioned forward; firing initiated at long ranges.	Long-range fires facilitate the delaying action.
Frontages up to four times that normally assigned to units on the defensive.	Forces conducting a delaying action are normally assigned frontages in excess of that normal for enemy units on the defense.
Prepositioning of nuclear weapons.	Prepositioning nuclear weapons facilitates the delaying action.
Discovery of dummy minefields.	Dummy minefields are easier and faster to prepare than active fields but cause approximately the same delay to advancing pursuers.

## WITHDRAWAL INDICATORS

Indications for withdrawal are generally the same as those for delaying action with the addition of the following indicators.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Systematic destruction of bridges, communication facilities and other assets in enemy-held territory.	Deliberate demolition and scorched earth tactics may be employed in military withdrawals.
Establishment of a covering force rear guard.	Cover movement or withdrawal of and main body. The rear guard fights delaying action, if required.
Increased use of night-driving devices in all areas.	The enemy will attempt to withdraw at night, if possible.
Minimum logistical and medical services.	Nonessential logistics and medical services are withdrawn first.
Marking withdrawal routes.	Movement and location of traffic control units or parties to the rear along the LOCs that are to be used by major units.
Use of contaminated areas to camouflage forces and cover withdrawal.	Contamination hinders reconnaissance and pursuit.
Presence of rear guard/covering force.	Minimizes losses and permits main body more freedom of movement.
Preparation of future defensive lines behind main defensive structure.	If the withdrawal is deliberate, the enemy will want new positions ready before withdrawing.
Jamming or destruction of friendly air and ground battlefield surveillance radar.	Battlefield surveillance radars are capable of detecting withdrawals at night or during conditions of poor visibility.
Engineer reconnaissance and MOD detected long LOCs, tunnels, built-up areas, dams, and dikes.	Withdrawing forces will begin to systematically destroy all crossings and implement obstacles as they withdraw.
Stockpiling of explosives at central points. Distribution and establishment of small dumps of explosives and land mines near bridges, possible abatis sites, and other demolition target sites.	Withdrawing forces will attempt to delay pursuit with obstacles.
Preparation of target for systematic or hasty destruction.	Same as above.
Deception operations, such as dummy radio traffic.	Withdrawing units will attempt to portray a normal defense.
Smoke operations, such as dummy radio traffic.	Withdrawals must be unobserved to be effective.
Rearward movement of long-range back artillery.	Long-range artillery will be moved to new positions before the withdrawal takes place.
Movement of small reconnaissance parties to the rear.	Withdrawing units need current reconnaissance along withdrawal routes.

Displacement to the rear of emitters associated with logistics units. Destruction or removal of logistic material from existing depot and dump locations to the rear. Logistics are withdrawn first to avoid being overrun during a possible pursuit.

## NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDICATORS

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Heavily guarded movement of supplies, equipment, and material.	Movement of supplies, equipment, and material of nuclear nature requires special security measures.
Heavily guarded installations.	Sites for storage of nuclear supplies and the locations of delivery units are heavily guarded.
Preparation of heavy artillery positions.	Primary and alternate positions for nuclear delivery artillery are prepared before movement of the units.
Presence of radars and other electronic equipment associated with SSMs.	SSM systems employ meteorological radars for control.
Movement of small, heavily guarded convoys, including closed vans, with high percentage of automatic weapons.	Nuclear warheads are moved under heavy security, usually in closed vans. Escort vehicles are equipped with machine guns.
Light aircraft circling over moving convoy.	Nuclear warhead convoys often use aerial radio relays to maintain communication.
Movement of small groups of heavily armed helicopters escorted by tactical fighters.	Nuclear warheads may be moved by helicopters, with guards and armed helicopters as escort. Tactical aircraft may provide air cover.
Movement of trailers with rockets missile or missile bodies.	Trailers are used to resupply and rocket units.
Identification of tall, slender objects, like towers, chimneys, or narrow trees, not previously in the area.	Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees, such as poplars.
Large, well-guarded complexes, including tank-trucks, radars, electronic equipment, generators, and maintenance tents, located well to the rear.	SSM units require extensive ground handling equipment.
Heavily guarded closed vans.	Nuclear warheads normally are carried in closed vans that are heavily guarded.
Evacuation or exclusion of civilians from specific areas suitable for nuclear storage or delivery sites.	Civilians may be evacuated from areas selected for nuclear storage or delivery sites.
Presence of meteorological radars.	An END TRAY RADAR is part of the organic equipment of both the FROG and SCUD systems, as well as other nuclear-capable systems. (END TRAYS also are

Construction of FROG, SCUD, or SCALEBOARD/SS-21/SS-23/8S-22 launch positions.	found with conventional artillery and Air Force units.) All of these systems have confirmed nuclear capabilities. A survey-controlled launch position is constructed for each TEL before occupation.
Movement of SSM TELs to a launch site within 1/3 to 1/2 maximum range from the FLOT.	SSM TELs remain in camouflaged positions until movement to the launch area.
Passage of wind data from mid-range position to a command or technical element.	Enemy SSM accuracy is heavily dependent on wind data.
Passage of nonsense word over command and selected fire control nets.	May be a code word relative to preparation for or execution of a nuclear fire mission.
Volume of traffic on command nets suddenly increasing then dropping to a low level or stand-down.	May reflect passage of strike warnings followed by preparation for electro-magnetic pulse.
Identification of surface-to-surface missile unit-peculiar equipment.	Presence of nuclear-capable systems.
Limited withdrawal of frontline units without apparent tactical reason.	Frontline units may withdraw for a limited distance to avoid casualties from close-in nuclear explosives.
Sudden and energetic digging in enemy areas.	Prior to use of nuclear weapons, frontline units may be ordered to dig deeper foxholes or take other individual protective measures.
Large concentrations of radios, radars, and other electronic equipment located in the vicinity of suitable sites for guided missile launching.	Concentration of equipment is necessary to guide and control guided missiles, which must be located in close proximity of the launching site.
Sudden increase in communications and electronic activity.	Increase may be incident to delivery of nuclear weapons, for example, last minute orders and warnings, and use of electronic guidance and control.
Use of smoke cover on front-line troops.	Smoke may be used to protect troops against thermal effects of weapons used in close support.
Disappearance of known enemy agents from specific areas.	Prior to nuclear attack of an area, agents may be ordered to leave the area.
Increased or unusual air activity.	Delivery of nuclear weapons by air may require a temporary degree of local air superiority, special photo mission, or practice flight pattern runs by the delivery aircraft.
Additional antitank elements with first echelon units.	Enemy will expect friendly forces to react to a nuclear strike with tank-heavy forces. Also, tanks have greater survivability under

	nuclear conditions.
Movement of small convoys from the warhead storage areas.	Warheads being moved to be mated to missiles.
Removal of antennas and other equipment mounted on the exterior of vehicles.	To prevent blast damage.
Lowering of windshields on vehicles.	See above.
Removal of camouflage nets.	See above.
Movement of vehicles to reverse slopes.	See above.
Location of missile and/or free rocket units within striking maximum distances.	Missile and free rocket units are located within one third of the range from the line of contact on the offense, and one half of the maximum range on the defense.
Use of missiles or free rockets used to with high-explosive warheads.	Missile and free rockets may be delivered high-explosive warheads either in a normal support role or in a registration.
Location of very heavy artillery within supporting distance of frontlines.	Nuclear delivery artillery is located within one third of its maximum range from the line of contract on the offense, and one half of the maximum range on the defense.
Registration of very heavy artillery.	Registration may be conducted using smoke and low charge or high explosive projectiles prior to firing a nuclear projectile.
Special or unusual activity by frontline troops.	Frontline troops may construct special positions, usually deep or cover fighting positions, before enemy use of nuclear weapons.
Air defense weapons are deployed cover possible warhead storage areas.	Enemy expects friendly air to attempt to destroy nuclear warheads in storage.
Use of high-explosive warheads from SSMs or heavy artillery in a normal support role.	Indicates presence of nuclear-capable systems.
Use of missile-associated terms on selected radio nets.	See above.
Preparation of future launching positions.	See above.
Inability to locate previously identified missile units.	May be moving to firing positions.
Additional administrative, command, fire control, and logistics nets identified in the area of interest.	If these nets can be identified as nuclear-related, they indicate the presence of nuclear-capable units.
Presence of heavy artillery.	203 millimeter self-propelled (SP) gun, 240 millimeter SP mortar, and towed 203 and 240 have nuclear delivery capabilities, as to 152 millimeter SP guns.
Deployment of jamming assets.	Jammers are deployed to protect critical targets like nuclear units.

## **APPENDIX H**

# **ENEMY STRENGTH COMPUTATIONS**

Enemy strength undergoes a continuous fluctuation between tables of organization and equipment (TOE)-type strengths and varying levels of force, unit, equipment, and personnel strengths during the course of a battle, campaign, or war. These fluctuations are a result of unit, personnel, and equipment losses and the enemy's ability or inability to provide suitable replacements quickly and consistently.

Enemy strength computations provide a method for estimating the level of combat effectiveness of enemy forces. It is computed in terms of committed forces, reinforcing and supporting units, and the number of nuclear weapons and chemical and biological delivery systems suspected or identified as being deployed within the friendly commander's area of operations, or interest.

Based on the analyst's knowledge of enemy doctrine, OB, and current information and intelligence on enemy dispositions, locations, and capabilities; the numbers of committed, reinforcing, and supporting forces can be computed.

Once these enemy forces have been determined, individual enemy units can be identified or located and enemy strength computed. Personnel and equipment strengths are described as percentages of known TOE-type strengths, based upon reported enemy personnel and equipment losses and known or estimated rates of replacement.

## **COMMITTED FORCES AND REINFORCEMENTS**

Committed forces are those enemy ground units, in contact, whose area of employment is not expected to change to counter the specific course of action selected by the friendly commander. Committed forces may change disposition within their area of employment, but no significant delay is involved in their employment. Designation of enemy forces as committed forces depends primarily upon their disposition, location at the time of the estimate, and the echelon at which the estimate is being prepared.

Reinforcements are those enemy forces whose area of possible employment against the friendly force depends on the friendly selection of a specific course of action and on enemy capabilities.

Reinforcements include all known enemy forces which are neither committed against a friendly force nor committed outside the friendly zone or sector, but which can reasonably be considered capable of closing with the friendly force in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission.

Estimates of NBC enemy capabilities usually are prepared at field army and higher headquarters. Units below field army level usually lack the means to gather the information to make such estimates. They use the estimates of the higher headquarters and modify them with available information.

The determination of enemy NBC operation capabilities is based primarily on estimates of numbers and types of weapons and amount and types of agents available, knowledge of enemy doctrine, past experience, and estimates of enemy capabilities involving the employment of ground troops. It is rarely possible to estimate what portion of the available enemy NBC effort may be used against a division or corps within a field army or a command in the communications zone. It is also rarely possible to

estimate the number of nuclear weapons the enemy is capable of using within a period as short as one day. The period selected is a month or longer, depending on the available information and past experience.

The statement of the enemy's capability of using chemical and biological agents includes the amount, type, and delivery means of available agents.

## **COMPUTING COMMITTED ENEMY UNITS**

The information provided by the G2/S2 on enemy committed forces and reinforcements is used by the commander and the operations officer for planning and conducting tactical operations. Accurate information is particularly important during the commander's analysis of opposing courses of action. For example, in planning for an attack, an overestimation of committed enemy forces and an underestimation of enemy reinforcements could cause the friendly commander to attack with a small reserve. The intelligence officer's error in computing committed and reinforcing forces could allow the enemy to counterattack with an unexpectedly strong force, inflicting unacceptable casualties upon the friendly force.

All uncommitted enemy forces are considered as reinforcements if they can be committed in time to affect the accomplishment of the mission. If there is doubt as to whether an enemy unit is committed or reinforcing, it is considered as a reinforcement. This reduces the risk of surprise.

Expressing strength in number of units, by type, within an enemy force is stressed because it is a simple, reliable, and readily understood method of computing enemy strength. At the same time, the OB analyst cannot ignore individual unit strength computations. This is particularly important in arriving at a true picture of the enemy's strength.

Strength by type of unit includes the total number of enemy units listed by category and type. Normally, enemy units are counted down to and including two echelons below the friendly force's level of command. Some special purpose units three echelons below may also be counted.

Usually, an intelligence officer accounts for committed enemy forces by the size of the enemy unit which is opposing the friendly elements. Against an enemy army, a division G2 usually counts committed forces in terms of battalions; a corps G2 in terms of regiments; and field army and higher headquarters, in terms of divisions. At headquarters above field army, a statement of the number of armies and army groups is also included. For example, "The committed forces facing this army group consist of one army group (3 combined arms armies with a total of 11 MRDs and 3 tank divisions). . . ." When committed forces, such as guerrillas, do not have a known organization, their strength is stated in total numbers.

The brigade S2 considers as committed forces the first and second echelon companies of enemy motorized rifle, tank, or reconnaissance battalions in contact with the brigade. Although the enemy company is the basic sizes unit used by the brigade S2 in accounting for committed forces, he will also account for smaller units which have been located as separately employed.

The battalion S2 considers as committed forces the first and second echelon platoons of the enemy motorized rifle, tank, or reconnaissance companies in contact with the battalion. Although the enemy



platoon is the basic unit used by the battalion S2 in accounting for committed forces, available intelligence frequently does not enable the individual platoons composing the enemy company to be located. Therefore, the battalion S2 will consider that a located enemy company normally consists of three platoons; a company (-) consists of two platoons. The process of counting committed forces in the defense and in the offense is shown in the following illustrations.

COUNTING COMMITTED FORCES IN THE DEFENSE				
When the US is in the defense				
LOOKS FOR				
THE	LOOKS AT	MR	Tk	RECON
Battalion S2	1st Echelon Bns	Plts	Plts	Plts
Brigade S2	1st Echelon Rgts	Cos	Cos	Cos
Division G2	1st Echelon Divs	Bns	Bns	Bns

COUNTING COMMITTED FORCES IN THE OFFENSE				
When the US is in the offense				
LOOKS FOR				
THE	LOOKS AT	MR	Tk	RECON
Battalion S2	Between LD/LC and the Objective	Plts	Plts	Plts
Brigade S2	Between LD/LC and the Objective	Cos	Cos	Cos
Division G2	Between LD/LC and the Objective	Bns	Bns	Bns

The designation of enemy units as committed forces depends primarily on their disposition and location at the time the estimate is made. Enemy unit identification may facilitate determining if a particular unit is the reserve of elements in contact with the brigade or battalion.

When an enemy unit of the size used in accounting for committed forces is in contact with two adjacent friendly units, the entire enemy unit is considered to be committed by the G2 or S2 of both friendly units. For example, if an enemy battalion is in contact with elements of two adjacent US divisions, both division G2s consider the entire battalion as committed against their respective divisions. This points out the need for correct identification and accurate strength computation at each echelon.

All ground Fire Support (FS) weapons organic to the enemy MRB or MRR are referred to as normal regimental artillery and are always considered to be in support of committed forces. That is, each committed unit is assumed to have available to it its normal proportion of the available supporting weapons organic to the regiment. These weapons, therefore, need not be enumerated. FS weapons not organic to enemy motorized battalions or regiments which can be identified as within supporting range are enumerated as if in support of committed forces. In the event that the forces committed against the

brigade or battalion have no known TOE (that is, volunteer or irregular-type units), all FS weapons which can be identified are enumerated.

When enumerating enemy forces, enemy security elements forward of the combat outpost line are normally considered reinforcements of the main defensive position until contact with these security elements is made. The intelligence officer must correctly identify the enemy's main defensive positions and must not be deceived by security forces. The security forces will normally become reinforcements for the main defense after completing their security mission.

In addition to determining the enemy's ground combat unit strength in terms of committed forces and reinforcements, the G2 or S2 also considers the enemy's air and nuclear weapons strength. However, as estimates of enemy air NBC warfare strength are usually prepared only at field army level and higher, the G2/S2 simply restates these capabilities in his estimate.

Reinforcements are stated conveniently and meaningfully. For example, if the opposing division has an MRR in reserve, this reinforcement is referred to as a motorized regiment rather than three motorized battalions. When enemy units--either committed forces or reinforcements--are very much under strength, the estimated remaining strength is expressed. Two divisions, each at half strength, are usually more formidable than a single division at full strength because of the added flexibility of employment and the additional combat support probably available. A half-strength field artillery battalion is more than half as effective as a full strength battalion.

When only two elements of a unit can be located, they are counted as they appear. By templating, it may be possible to determine the approximate location of the third element. Although this unit cannot be counted, the commander should be advised as to its possible location.

## **COMPUTING ENEMY REINFORCEMENTS**

The time required for an enemy to move troops from one place to another and commit them is determined by factors derived from analysis of past similar enemy movements. The considerations described below are applicable in training and as a point of departure for the development of experience factors in operations against an enemy force.

To determine the time when the enemy can employ an uncommitted unit, the travel time from the unit location to a logical point where the unit can be committed is calculated. To the travel time, add the closing time (pass time of a column). Except when observation of enemy units is continuous, it is assumed that any unit could have started to move immediately after its last reported location. Therefore, to determine the earliest time at which the enemy can reinforce, add the travel plus closing time to the time last observed. For example, if an enemy reinforcement was last observed at 0800 hours, and it can deploy to envelop the northern flank in 1 hour, it is assumed that the attack can be launched as early as 0900 hours (0800 plus 1 hour). In the exceptional case involving piecemeal commitment of enemy reinforcements, consider travel time only. Forces which are committed piecemeal do not close into an assembly area or attack position.

Because observation of reinforcements is rarely continuous, statements of enemy reinforcing capabilities should include both the earliest time and that time after starting movement when the reinforcement can be accomplished. For example, "the enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th

MRR at 0900 hours, or 1 hour after starting movements." When the time since the last report is greater than the time after starting movement, only the time after starting movement is given. For example, "the enemy can reinforce his attack with the 45th MRR now or 1 hour after starting movement." When the number of reinforcements is large or the enemy is capable of reinforcing in several areas, reinforcing capabilities are presented in tabular form. For example, the enemy can reinforce his attack or his defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated in the following chart.

In selecting a logical point for reinforcement, the effects of AO characteristics, such as avenues of approach and logical enemy reactions to friendly courses of action, are considered. For reinforcement of an attack capability, locations for second echelon commitment are selected for battalions and regiments and forward assembly areas for division and larger units. For units moving to reinforce a defense, defense or counterattack positions are selected. For movements by aircraft, logical LZs or DZs from which the enemy forces can materially affect the accomplishment of the mission are selected.

<b>EXAMPLES OF ESTIMATING REINFORCEMENTS</b>			
<b>UNIT</b>	<b>PLACE</b>	<b>MOTOR</b>	<b>FOOT</b>
45th MRR	RJ 6385	Now or 1 hr after starting movement	091205 Jun or 4 hr 5 min after starting movement
	RJ 8880	090930 Jun or 1 hr 30 min after starting movement	091605 Jun or 8 hr 5 min after starting movement
	RJ 6385	09100 Jun or 2 hr after starting movement	100740 Jun or 23 hr 5 min after starting movement
	RJ 8880	090920 Jun or 1 hr 20 min after starting movement	091430 Jun or 6 hr 30 min after starting movement

The time required by the enemy to issue extra ammunition, make detailed reconnaissance, issue orders, and deploy to a line of departure is not considered because all may be completed before starting the operation or simultaneously with movement.

The following guidance is applicable until experience factors against a particular enemy are developed:

- Compute foot marching time for all appropriate reinforcements. Compute motor movement time only for distances greater than 10 kilometers (6 miles). If a unit is observed in trucks, compute only the motor movement time.
- Consider a foot march of more than 32 kilometers (20 miles) as a forced march. Consider a motor movement of more than 280 kilometers (175 miles) as a forced march for motorized units and a movement of more than 224 kilometers (140 miles) as a forced march for tank units.
- Compute closing time at the night rate of march if a column begins to close before the BMNT closing time; if a column begins to close at or shortly after BMNT, use the day rate of march. If a column begins to close before the EENT, use the day rate of march; if a column begins to close at or shortly after EENT, use the night rate of march.

- Move and close the entire unit to move an enemy infantry battalion. To move a unit of regimental or larger size, move and close two thirds of the combat elements; that is, two battalions of an infantry regiment, two regiments of an infantry division.

## **COMPUTING COMBAT STRENGTH**


The method for computing combat strength, as discussed in the preceding paragraphs, is illustrated in the following three situations:

### **SITUATION 1**

The 20th Infantry Division is advancing to the south. The advance of the division has been stopped by elements of two MRRs (8th and 12th) of the enemy 16th MRD. Each of these MRRs has two MRBs in contact and one MRB in the second echelon. The third MRR (96th) is in contact with the 72d Infantry Division on the flank of the 20th Infantry Division. About 40 kilometers (25 miles) in rear of the 16th MRD and in the area of the 20th Infantry Division objective, two MRRs (43d and 75th) of the enemy 12th MRD are preparing field fortifications.


The four battalions of the 8th and 12th MRRs in contact with the 20th Infantry Division are considered as committed forces by the 20th Infantry Division G2. Regardless of the specific courses of action selected by the commander of the 20th Infantry Division to continue the advance, the area of employment of these four battalions in contact will not change appreciably. The second-echelon battalions of the 8th and 12th MRRs are not considered committed since they are not in contact and can be employed in other areas. The 96th MRR would be considered committed and mentioned in the composition subparagraph of the observation post (OP) order, but only its second-echelon battalion would be listed as a reinforcement by the 20th Division. The other two battalions are committed against the 72d Division and are not available as reinforcements against the 20th Division. The 43d and 75th MRRs of the 12th MRD are considered as reinforcements because these units are not committed against the friendly force and can be committed in time to affect the mission of the 20th Infantry Division. Although the two MRRs of the 12th MRD are digging field fortifications in the vicinity of the division objective, the enemy commander can employ these units against either the 20th Infantry Division or adjacent divisions. (See the following schematic sketch illustration.)

Schematic sketch situation 1.



## SITUATION 2

The 20th Infantry Division is attacking to the east. Enemy committed forces are the 3d MRB; 3d GMRR; three battalions of the 5th MRR, and the 1st Battalion; 7th MRR; the 2d Battalion; 33d GMRR is committed against units on the 20th Infantry Division flanks. The 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d GMRR and the 2d Battalions 7th MRR are not in contact and are second-echelon battalions which may be employed against the 20th Infantry Division. They are considered reinforcements. Two enemy MRR in the assembly area astride the 20th Infantry Division north boundary and the enemy MRR south of the south boundary are reinforcements. From their locations and dispositions, it is apparent that they are the reserves of the regiments committed against the 20th Infantry Division. Depending on the course of action selected by the commander of the 20th Infantry Division and the enemy plans, all or part of these enemy elements can be employed against the 20th Infantry Division, at various times and places; in time to affect the accomplishment of the division mission. (See the following schematic illustration.)



### SITUATION 3

This example discusses the determination of enemy strength opposing the 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, and each of its composite units: the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry; and the 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry.

The 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division, with the 1st Battalion, 69th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 70th Infantry forward are defending positions as indicated in the schematic sketch illustration on page H-14. Reports from the 21st Infantry Division indicate the enemy has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons available.

The S2, 1st Brigade, determines enemy strength as follows:

- Committed Forces; 1st Brigade is opposed by three motorized rifle companies, one reconnaissance platoon, and one medium tank company (13 tanks) supported by normal regimental artillery, plus two 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns (SP), and all available air and nuclear weapons.
- Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1st Brigade are an unidentified MRB located in the vicinity of Hill 250.

The three motorized rifle platoons northwest of the Highway 82 bridge are disposed so that they logically constitute one motorized rifle company in contact with, and committed against, the 1st Brigade. The reconnaissance platoon southwest of Hill 200 and the motorized rifle company northeast of the Highway 82 Bridge are in contact with, and committed against, the 1st Brigade and its respective adjacent brigades. All three platoons of the company northeast of the Highway 82 bridge are considered as one company committed against 1st Brigade, since brigades account for committed forces in terms of companies. The motorized rifle company immediately south of Chigger Woods is located so that it is, logically, the reserve company of an enemy battalion in contact with 1st Brigade and is therefore

considered committed. The motorized rifle companies of the 25th and 23d Regiments, located to the east and west of the 1st Brigade sector, are totally committed against adjacent brigades and are, therefore, neither committed nor available as reinforcements against 1st Brigade, 21st Infantry Division. Ten medium tanks are located in the vicinity of the motorized rifle companies committed against 1st Brigade and are, therefore, also committed. S2, 1st Brigade would be equally correct to account for these committed medium tanks as three medium tank platoons or ten medium tanks. (The three amphibious tanks organic to the reconnaissance platoon, although not specifically located at this time, are accounted for as normal components of one reconnaissance platoon.) The 85mm SP gun and 120mm mortars located north of the Muddy River are part of the normal regimental artillery. However, they are within supporting range and are, therefore, enumerated as in support of committed forces. The enemy also has an unknown number of air and nuclear weapons, which can be employed in support of committed forces.

S2, 1-69th Infantry, determines enemy strength now opposing the battalion as follows:

- Committed Forces: 1-69 Infantry is opposed by two motorized rifle platoons, one reconnaissance platoon, and one medium tank platoon, supported by normal regimental artillery, plus six 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns (SP), and all available air and nuclear weapons.
- Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1-69 Infantry are an unidentified MRB located vicinity of Hill 250 and an unidentified motorized rifle company and medium tank platoon located vicinity of Chigger Woods.

One motorized rifle platoon is in sole contact with, and therefore committed against, 1-69 Infantry. The motorized rifle platoon north of boundary 1-69 and 1-70 Infantry is counted as committed against both 1-69 Infantry and 1-70 Infantry. The medium tank platoon in the same vicinity is in contact with and therefore committed against both 1-69 Infantry and 1-70 Infantry. S2, 1-69 Infantry, considers all of the reconnaissance platoons in contact because this is the size force the battalion S2 uses for computation of enemy strength. None of the tanks organic to this platoon have been specifically located at this time; however, they are accounted for as a normal component of the reconnaissance platoon. The motorized rifle company and tank platoon located vicinity Chigger Woods which are considered as committed by S2, 1st Brigade could logically be employed against 1-69 Infantry in time to affect the accomplishment of the battalion mission and are therefore considered as reinforcements. The discussion above concerning the battalion vicinity Hill 250, the normal regimental artillery and nonorganic weapons in support of committed forces, applies also to the determination by S2, 1-69 Infantry.

S2, 1-70 Infantry, determines enemy strength now opposing the battalion as follows:

- Committed Forces: 1-70 Infantry is opposed by four motorized rifle platoons and two medium tank platoons supported by normal regimental artillery, plus six 160mm mortars, six 122mm howitzers, six 100mm AT guns (SP) and all available air and nuclear weapons.
- Reinforcements: Enemy reinforcements available for commitment in the sector of 1-70 Infantry are an unidentified MRB located vicinity Hill 250 and an unidentified motorized rifle company and medium tank platoon located vicinity Chigger Woods.

S2, 1-70 Infantry, considers the individually located motorized rifle platoons vicinity boundary 1-69 Infantry and 1-70 Infantry in the same manner as does S2, 1-69 Infantry.

Two platoons of the motorized company northeast of Highway 82 bridge are considered committed against 1-70 Infantry. S2, 4-80 mechanized, could also consider two platoons of this company committed against this battalion. The discussion concerning reinforcements and supporting fires supporting fires applies also in the determination by S2, 1-70 Infantry. (See schematic sketch, situations.)

## **COMPUTING COMBAT POWER**

To compute combat power, the following terms must be thoroughly understood:

- War established strength.
- Effective strength

War establishment strength is the maximum number of personnel or equipment that a unit would be authorized to have in time of war. Equipment includes both weapons and ammunition, as well as common and specialized equipment provided to a unit from established TOE-Type documents. War establishment strength is also referred to as full wartime strength.

Effective strength is the assessed number of personnel or equipment in a unit that is currently capable of combat employment. It is usually expressed as a percentage of the war establishment strength. Effective strength can be broken down by type of unit and is expressed as Infantry, Armor, Artillery, or air strength.



$$\frac{(Wt-Lt+Rt) + (Wa-La+Ra) (Wg-Lg+Rg)}{Wt+Wa+Wg} \times 100 = \%$$

Rg = Assessed reinforcement or replacement artillery guns

Equipment and personnel estimates will need to take account of all relevant information, such as the items listed in the equipment strength calculation considerations chart.

#### **EQUIPMENT STRENGTH CALCULATION CONSIDERATIONS**

1. The availability of and accessibility to depot stocks.
2. The industrial potential and ability of industry to produce new equipment and replace equipment in required quantities.
3. Known national strategy and priorities, especially when forces are committed to more than one theater.
4. The adequacy and security of LOCs.
5. The combat intensity.
6. The numbers of, and information secured from, EPW--including deserters.
7. Captured equipment reports.
8. The efficiency of or damage to equipment repair facilities.

Personnel strength is expressed as percentages of TOE strength where possible. However, a numerical expression of "bean count" may be necessary to present a better understanding of the combat capability of a force, and provide the commander with a basis for comparison. The computation of enemy strength requires the utmost caution and alertness for intelligence that may reveal the enemy's actual strength. This is especially true at the onset of hostilities, when accurate intelligence pertaining to enemy strength is lacking or inadequate, and the initial strength figure is only an approximation. The formula is as follows:

TOE STRENGTH LOSSES + REPLACEMENTS + EFFECTIVE STRENGTH

THEN

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH x 100 = % COMBAT EFFECTIVE TOE STRENGTH

In time of peace, personnel strength generally is computed by annual induction quota, multiplied by the term of conscription, plus cadre, as follows:

$$AIQ \times TOC + C = S$$

The information in the following personnel strength calculations considerations chart should be considered when computing personnel strengths.

#### **PERSONNEL STRENGTH CALCULATION CONSIDERATIONS**

1. The availability of trained reserves.
2. The personnel available for mobilization.
3. The speed and system of mobilization.
4. The speed and ability of training systems to produce further trained personnel.
5. The national strategy and priorities, especially when forces are committed to more than one theater.
6. The adequacy and security of LOC.

7. The combat intensity.
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Combat loss data, resulting from post-attack assessment, provides input to compute enemy strength. Information concerning strength also provides indications of enemy capabilities and assists in determining the probable courses of action or options open to enemy commanders. A lack of, or a superiority of, strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Similarly, a marked concentration of units in an area gives indications of enemy objectives and probable courses of action. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential enemy forces are important factors which indicate the enemy's intention and capability to wage war.

## APPENDIX I

# ACRONYMS

AAU	Add-on Audio Unit
ACE	Analytic and Control Element
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
ADSID	Air Deliverable Seismic Intrusion Device
AEB	Aerial Exploitation Battalion
AFC	Armored Fighting Vehicle
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
ASAS	All-Source Analysis System
ASIS	All-Source Intelligence Section
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
ASPS	All-Source Production Section
AO	Area of Operations
BA	Battlefield Area
BM	Bench Mark
CAA	Combined Arms Army
C&D	Cover and Deception
CP	Command Post
CTOC	Corps Tactical Operations Center

DAG	Division Artillery Group
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DF	Direction Finding
DISE	Deployable Intelligence Support Element
DSID	Disposable Seismic Intrusion Device
DTG	Date-Time-Group
DTOC	Division Tactical Operations Center
EA	Electronic Attack
EMID	Electromagnetic Intrusion Detector
EP	Electronic Protection
ES	Electronic Support
EW	Electronic Warfare
FA	Field Artillery
FAC	Forwarded Air Controller
FAIO	Field Artillery Intelligence Officer
FEBA	Forward Edge of the Battle Area
FIST	Fire Support Teams
FLOT	Forward Line of Own Troops
FS	Fire Support
FSE	Fire Support Element
FSO	Fire Support Officer

HF	High Frquency
HVT	High Value Target
IEW	Intelligence and Electronic Warfare
INTREP	Intelligence Report
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
IR	Information Requirements
LTIOV	Latest Time Information Will Be of Value
MAGID	Magnetic Intrusion Detector
MI	Military Intelligence
MINSID	Miniaturized Seismic Intrusion Device
OB	Order of Battle
OPSEC	Operations Security
PERINTREP	Periodic Intelligence Report
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirements
RAG	Regimental Artillery Group
REC	Radio Electronic Combat (not a US term)
REMS	Remote Sensors
RF	Radio Frequency

SASO	Stability and Support Operation
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIGSEC	Signal Security
SLAR	Side-Looking Airborne Radar
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
STANO	Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation
SUPINTREP	Supplementary Intelligence Report
TAA	Tactical Air Army
TAB	Target Acquisition Battery
TFS	Tactical Fighter Squadron
TI	Tactical Intelligence
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
TOE	Tables of Organization and Equipment
TSO	Tactical Surveillance Officer
TVA	Target Value Analysis